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Gary I. Amendola 
AMENDOLA & DO'l'Y, PLLC 
702 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d 1 Alene, ID 83814 
ephone: (208} 664-8225 
Facsimile: (208) 765-104 6 
ISBN: 4872 
A-ctorr..eys Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF I 
Dl i .!.,,.!.. CASE l~O .. 809-5187 
vs. ORDER REGARDING PROBATION 
LONNIE L. ALLEN, 
Defendant. 
was held on December 20,2011. The Defendant: Lonnie I;. was 
present and represented by his attorney Gary I. Amendola of 
Amendola & Doty, PL~C. The State of Idaho was present and 
represen-ced by Bonner County Attorney s Marshall. 
Af1:er considering the evidence presented and the argunent of 
counsel, the Court rules as follows: 
ORDER REGARDING P.R.OSAUON -1 
ld/ ,d!j/ ddll HITit:Nl JLH & vu I T ' r'LLL 
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion J..s granted in part and denied in 
part. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 
January 7, 2010 in this case is 
as December 20, 
probation ordered on 
to unsupervised probation 
DATED of December 2011. 
ORD!~ ~~IN~ PROBATION -2 
1 
HI'I!::.Nl '' JLH 6 lJU I I , 1-'LLL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that or: the _L___ day of December 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the rr.ethod. 
indicated below, and addressed tc the following: 
GARY I. AMENDOLA 
AMENDOLA & DOTY, PLLC 
702 N. 4TH STREEt 
COEUR ALENE, ~D 83814 
LOUIS MARSP.ALL 
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
127 S F:RST AVENUE 
SANDPOINT, ID 838 
PROBAT=ON & PAROLE 
IDAHO DEPT OF CORRECTIONS 
202 ANTON, 0 
COEUR D' ALENE, ID 83815 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
u.s. Mail 
Har:d Delivered 
Facsimile to: 208-765-1046 
Overnight rV:ail 
u.s. Mail 
J Hand De 




Facsi~ile to: 208-769-:481 
Mail 
Gary I. Amendola 
AMENDOLA & DOTY, PLLC 
702 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 664-8225 
Facsimile: 208) 765-1046 
ISBN: 4872 
Attorne s for fondant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FIRST JUDICIAL TRICT OF 
STATE 0 IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDF.HO, 
Plainti 
VS~ 
LONNIE L. ALLEN, 
De 
NOTICE IS GIVEN that ry 
AMENDOLA & DOTY, PLLC, shall br 
Cl\SE NO. CR 9-5187 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
DATE: July 2, 2012 
TIME: 2:00p.m. 
JUDGE: Judge Verby 
PLACE: Bonner County 
Courthouse 
Amendo a. of the law firm of 
on for hea ng a Motion to 
Te nate Unsupervised Probation, a Mot for Relief from 
Probation Violation, and a Motion for Relief under Idaho Code 
§19-2604 before the Honorable Judge Verby on t e 2nd day of July, 
2012, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m., or as soon herea r as 
coun el can be heard. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 1-
TO CLIENT 
0208 r)ATE ___ ~
DATED this day of f 2012. 
AMENDOLA & DOTY, PLLC 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on the 
be served a true and correct copy of the 
ind cated below, and addressed o t 
ll 
I sed to 
the method 
BONNER COUNTY PROS 
127 S. FIRST AVENUE 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 [X] 208- 63-6 6 
0. /()\ \ )~~(_)/) 
~y I. Amendola 
l·WTICE OF HEARING -2-
0~04 
Cl]t··.~F I Pt···lAT I Dt··.J 
DATE '3,R-TH1E DISTANT STATiot~ ID c _,. 
12082651447 .l 
MES~AGE CONFIRMRTION 
~V'"...:~~,...:..:~,.m",..,:-:-"' .... : .... ...:~~_...:..:..:..:.:-:~:-:-:..:-:..:--~~=..:..:-:..:-~....:..:..:..:~,.::; 
DATE 
05/17 
S,R-TIME DISTP.HT STP.TIOH ID 
00'40" 
:11:58 AMENDOLA & DOTY, PLLC 
Gary I. Amandola 
AMENDOLA & DOTY, PLLC 
702 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 3 4 
lepf:or1e: (2 8) 664 8 5 
F3csimile: (208) 765-l 46 
::LSBN; 4872 
Attorneys £or Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 






CASE NO. CR-2009-0005187 
REPORTER: DATE: 07/02/2012 TIME: 2:30PM 
CLERK: COURTROOM: 2 - Admin Building 
DIVISION: 
STATE OF IDAHO vs. LONNIE ALLEN 
Plaintiff I Petitioner Defendant I Respondent 
Attorney: LOUIS MARSHALL Attorney: GARY AMENDOLA 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION TO TERMINATE UNSUPERVISED PROBATION 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM PROBATION VIOLATION 
INDEX 
2:33 
SPEAKER PHASE OF CASE 
IJ I Calls Case 
I j Present: I DEFENDANT, GARY AMENDOLA, SHANE GREENBANK FOR LOUIS 
! 
I i MARSHALL 
jJ I WE DO NOT HAVE A COURT REPORTER- THIS MOTION WAS PREVIOUSLY FILED- IN 
I i REVIEWING THE FILE, I DID NOT SEE THE NEW MOTIONS -I'M NOT SURE WHAT HAS I 
I ' TAKEN PLACE 
GA THE MOTION TO TERMINATE SUPERVISED PROBATION IS A NEW MOTION -IN 
DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR, YOU WENT FROM SUPERVISED PROBATION TO 
UNSUPERVISED PROBATION- THE OTHER 2 MOTIONS WERE FILED BACK IN 
DECEMBER BUT WERE NOT RIPE FOR HEARING- I HAVE A COPY IF YOU WOULD 
LIKE TO SEE IT 
IJ , I WOULD PLEASE- YOU MAY PROCEED 
GA HAVE TESTIMONY FROM MR. ALLEN 
CLERK [SWEAR DEFENDANT UNDER OATH] 
GA STATE YOUR FULL NAME 
'DEF LONNIE LEE ALLEN 
GA 1 HAVE YOU RELOCATED AND OBTAINED DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENT? 
I DEF ' I HAVE BEEN WORKING AS A CONTRACT MANUFACTURER IN CALIFORNIA -I ASKED 
IF I COULD TAKE THE POSITION AS A CONTRACT PERSON AND THEY AGREED TO 
THAT 
GA YOU ARE AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AS OPPOSED TO AN EMPLOYEE? 
DEF !YES 
GA STATE WHAT YOU DO 
DEF A LOT OF DEFENSE WORK- ENGINEERING WORK AND REDESIGN 
GA YOU ARE A VET? 
DEF YES 
GA HAVE THEY CONTACTED YOU TO WORK ON DEFENSE? 
DEF YES- AS AN EMPLOYEE, IT ALLOWS THEM TO GO UP A TIER AND BE LOOKED AT 
FURTHER BECAUSE I AM A VETERAN 
GA WHERE DO YOU LIVE? 
DEF IN ORANGE COUNTY 
CASE NO. CR-2009-0005187 DATE: 07/02/2012 Page 1 of 3 

















































I AS LONG AS YOU ARE ON PROBATION, EVEN UNSUPERVISED, THAT'S REALLy 
HOLDING YOU BACK? 
YES 
i IT'S BEEN ALMOST 3 YEARS SINCE YOU WERE ARRESTED- HAVE YOU FOUND 
I ANYTHING POSITIVE ABOUT WHAT'S HAPPENED IN YOUR LIFE? 
J THERE DEFINITELY WAS SOME VERY GOOD THINGS THAT CAME OUT OF IT- RE-




, NO QUESTIONS 
I HAVE SOME BRIEF ARGUMENT 
I GOAHEAD 
I HE HAS DONE ALL OF THE THINGS THAT WERE ASKED OF HIM- THIS IS A VERY . UNIQUE CASE- LONNIE ALLEN HAS TURNED HIS LIFE AROUND- HE NEVER HAD 
I ANY CRIMINAL HISTORY BEFORE THAT WE ARE ASKING THAT YOU TERMINATE 
I PROBATION 6 MONTHS EARLY THEN ASK THAT YOU TAKE THE NEXT STEP TO SET 
I ASIDE THE ADMISSION OF A PROBATION VIOLATION AND DISMISS THAT PROCEEDING- THEN TO WITHDRAW HIS GUlL TY PLEA AND DISMISS THIS CASE-
J WE THINK THAT WOULD BE THE RIGHT THING TO DO TO ALLOW LONNIE ALLEN TO 
1 MOVE ON WITHOUT THE IMPEDIMENT OF A FELONY CONVICTION 
MR. GREENBANK? 
1 STATE HAS NO OBJECTION OF APPROPRIATE RELIEF -I AM DEFERRING TO THE 
I. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE DISMISSING THE PROBATION ENTIRELY 
I I DID REVIEW PORTIONS OF THE FILE INCLUDiNG THE PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION REPORT AND PRIOR HISTORY -I ALSO REVIEWED THE LEITER 
FROM DR. HUTCHISON- THE ISSUE OF PROBATION, I WILL GRANT THE MOTION -I 
THINK HE'S MADE GOOD STRIDE- IN TERMS OF TERMINATING PROBATION, AT THE 
DISCRETION OF THE COURT, I WILL ALLOW THAT- AS IT RELATES TO THE OTHER 
ISSUES, I AM BEING ASKED TO IGNORE SOMETHING THAT DID HAPPEN- WAS 
THERE A PROBATION VIOLATION AND THE ANSWER IS, YES- HIS PAST RECORD, 
THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT INDICATES THAT HE SERVED 30 DAYS 
FOR HIT AND RUN PROPERTY DAMAGE- HE WAS PLACED ON SUPERVISED 
PROBATION- AS IT RELATES TO THE FACT THAT A PROBATION VIOLATION DOES 
NOT EXIST, I CANNOT- AS IT RELATES TO RELIEF, I AM NOT GOING TO GRANT THE 
MOTION I' AM NOT ASKING THE COURT TO IGNORE THAT A PROBATION VIOLATION 
OCCURRED -IN YOUR DISCRETION, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT MAKING THE DRINKING 
OF A BEER WHICH IS WHAT IT WAS 
NO IT WASN'T- HE DID HAVE A PRIOR CONVICTION- HE DRANK 2 OR 3 BEERS 
I'M NOT SURE THAT SHOULD BE A PEDIMENT OF HAVING A FELONY CONVICTION ON 
HIS RECORD FOR THE REST OF HIS LIFE 
ON WHAT LEGAL BASIS -I HAVE NO AUTHORITY- UNLESS I HAVE SOMETHING- AT 
THIS POINT, I DON'T KNOW OF ANY AUTHORITY I HAVE FOR ME TO SAY THAT 
SOMETHING DIDN'T HAPPEN WHEN IT DID HAPPEN 
FAIR ENOUGH, THANK YOU JUDGE 
LETS BE CLEAR- HOW DO YOU WANT TO ADDRESS THIS- DO YOU WANT 
ADDITIONAL TIME TO PREPARE SOME TYPE OF BRIEF THAT SHOWS ME WHY I CAN? 
YES 
MR. GREENBANK, YOUR POSITION? 
I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT 
HOW MUCH TIME WOULD YOU LIKE? 
30 DAYS, YOUR HONOR- COULD I PREPARE AN ORDER THAT SAYS YOU ARE 
GRANTING THE MOTION TO TERMINATE PROBATION? 
CASE NO. CR-2009-0005187 DATE: 07/02/2012 Page 2 of 3 





J I WILL GIVE YOU UNTil AUGUST 3r:u 
GA THANK YOU 
J I'M NOT GOING TO MAKE A RULING ON THE REMAINING MOTIONS PENDING 
FURTHER INFORMATION 
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ICIAL S ICT OF THE 
COUNTY F BONNER 
CAS NO~ CR- C -
ORDER REGARDING 
DEFENDAl~T'S MOTIONS 
on to rminat 
ion for - ef s j_ frorn 
Probat on io at on, and the Defendant's Mot on for Ee ief under 
Idal:o Code § 19-2604 was he d on Ju y 2, 201 The Defendant 
Lonnie L. Allen was present and sen ted s att rney Gary 
I. Amendola of A§endo a & Doty, PLLC. The State of Ida was 
present and represented Bonner County y Prcsec ing 
Attorney Shane Greenbank. 
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS -l-
212 
After considering the ev presented a the argument of 
counsel, the Court rules as fol ows: 
IT IS ORDERED that t i to Terminate Uns rvised 
Probati s granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ha suoe sed ti 
ordered December 2 , G l t s case is terminated as of 
y 2 f 20 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED t t shall s a 
memorandum regard the r Relief r r rorri t 
ation on before 2. At tha point, he Court 
ll take a Relief f .!-' Ll 
lOlat on r r Idaho § 9-2604. 
DATE t f 2 . 
District Court 
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS -2-
1 
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Def e . Allen, t 
CASE NO. CR 2009-51 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
PROBATION VIOLATION 
s attorney Gary I. 
of AMENDOLA & DOTY, PLLC, s ts the 
fo OvJing in s c£ the Mot on for Re ief from Probation 
Violat on: 
Introduction 
On Jul 2, 2012, a hea 
the Motion for Eelief from 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 




on, r Motions, 
elation (the PV Mot ) . 
I the rv1otion, Ivir. has requested t s Court to set aside 
s admission -c ation and ss the t on 
viola-cion ng. · The grant of the PV Motion is a 
prerequisite o the Court cons ring, and hopefully granting, 
the Motion for Relief under Code § 19-2604. 
A Review of the Authority of the Court 
Courts have the power to ss a case, inherently and 
as granted sta e o rule. The Courts have always possessed 
certa::.. nheren powers reserved spec fically for the judicial 
branch and present at oo~~on aw. le the Idaho Constitution 
does not specif ca l ist t ese co~~on aw powers, among them 
are the powe o s spend a sentence. State v. , 9 I 
6, (197 
Actual , -ch s Court y needs to dete whe r it 
will grant the PV Motion to the extent of setting aside Mr. 
Allen's admission to a tion olaton. The ion 
viola ion ng need not be di ssed for this Court to 
proceed to consideration of the Motion for Relief under Idaho 
Code § 9-2604. See Idaho Code § 19-2604 ( ) a). 
At the July 2, 2012 hearing, the State of Idaho on 
the record that it had no ection to the Court granting the 
Motion for Relief under Idaho Code § 9-2604. State of Idaho 
apparently took on ition on r t s Court should 
the PV r--1otion. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM PROBATION VIOLATION -2-
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In the I rerne Court Lne s ion of 
vari s uri ct ons on the power f a 1 ary to s a 
sentence and concluded that ln Idaho, the Dist ct Courts possess 
the inherent po'vJer from the corrwon law. decisions 
Hale that "sometimes he u s before j 
.and some~imes after if it be a smal ony, the out 
of c ergy, or n order t a pardon or transportation" the Court 
held that the ia ss ss the rent power to permanent 
su a senter; e. t t Hales eas of the 
Crowi1, l.. 2 f s f p., 4 
Furthermore, be s separa-cion of rs ir1e, 
tne leg s ature s r to ive t c"ary 
of rs pertai ing 0 t . Ho\.vever, he rs 
rerna undef i ~cc a~ s comrnon sense s be 
e to determi Bot st and corrmon sense 
the no on .,_ t the ,,._ -'--s s inherent aut ri to 
ss cases. 
In the ci l context, courts ssess ~he inherent oower to 
dismiss a case because f a fai ure to prosecute wi-ch due 
diliger1ce. This pmver s i 
the court. Hansen v. reba 8 
independent and in tion to the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM PROBATION VIOLATION -3-
0~1 
of any statute or rule of 
Idaho 202 (1964 . 
nherent power +-'"' LV 
However, 
SS 1 the 
newer is specificall lined in I ho Rule of l Pro re 
41 b;. . at 2 5. Rule 4 b) the Idaho R les of 
Procedure mirrors the Federa equ lent \vhi "expressly 
authorizes di ssal for want of prosecution and t s g s 
formal sanction t what has long been regarded as an inherent 
power of the court." ng 2B Barron & Holt Federal 
Practice and Procedure, 38 § 9l_8 .. s, not on y dces the court 
possess the rent to smiss 1 civi cases, but formal 
le ac e tha r. 
Simi ar y, oa rts the power to dismiss cr nal 
cases a set: as ple s f y convl l s. Tire povJer 
is grar1ted _;_ f istorv~ The legislative 
is to of § 9- 60 9 5 and riginally 
prov t \\ s ab_c:ied the erms and 
conditi s of " s robat f court has 
not been executed order be entered for the de t's 
scharge." Idaho Session Laws 1915, Chapter 104, Section 7991 
sis 
The st:atute has evo ved to the present rm t exists 
toda , with the most recent 20 1. statute now 
prov s for specific j cial sere ion to set asi a 
conviction and enter a di ssal to a fe charge. The 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM PROBATION VIOLATION -4 
0~18 
tatement f Purpose r the 0 1 to Idaho § 9-
2604 des that the ccu s new the expl cit discretion 
under the statute di ssal. See Exh t A. 
In tion, because s have f ly dealt with cases 
where a convicti cannot be set aside and the matter ssed 
due to a or iso ated violation of tion, the scope of 
the power SITll S S s Furt r, the amendment was 
designed to de a nee for defendants to have their 
r' Cc._lOnS set as de p ide a tional i centive t 
ab t is 1 ead t increase i empl 
rt ities 
es of +- r 11 se ci Rules, f The Iv1i 
stra-c .._ ee tf1e s of t rch 16 f 011 
Senate Judicia & es ttee a so cate that legal 
counsel for Supreme Court explained the amendment 
aid for defenda s ;;.g them ctive a cant 
citizens and reased the ar1ces f r t to obta 
and ta a age of educationa rtunities. It becomes 
evident tha the legis ature is autho zing the court to set 
aside and ss acti s, even when there are nor tion 
violations, because it aids in rehabilitat of the defendant. 
See Exh it B. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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IvJore rt y, s authority under Idaho 
Cr R le 4 to ' ' 0 SffilSS a cr nal case for reas whe 
"the court ludes tha smissal) will serve the of 
ustice and the effect ve nis ration of the court's 
business." The bread scope of the rule provides the court with 
the discre to di ss a cr l case upon finding that the 
ends of st ce a administra ion of the court's 
bus ness s me so. r+--'-- has not 1 t~e rene: 
c bas pu suant - daho Code 
§ 9- 60 t smi s r Cr l ,1 
Motion to Withdraw Admission to Probation Violation 
s that a " to "' l e ~
hdrav.J a p ea ~ ~to cc~rect if est 
in usti a er ce. s author z t e rule 
to pern1l a f LO l s plea and to se as the 
of ccr~\licti 
It appears t t:he daho appe ~t-~ a~c courts have only 
considered the SSLe ~ . .<: v_;_ a defei,dant i to thdraw a" d 
admission to a ti vic ati in one case . The Idaho Court 
of ls held that because t defendant fi ed the +-' mOc.lOn after 
the courc: had transferred urisdiction to the rtment of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM PROBATION VIOLATION -6-
0~20 
Correction, the court lacked urisdiotion to rant or the 
+-' mOLl State Fleshman, 144 I 772 (Ct .. 007) 
The de in Fleshman argued that I nal Rule 
33 c) language was analogues to his motion to his 
admission to violating the terms of ion. In dicta, the 
Court stated that there is no specific rule all a sentenc 
court to ithdraw an admiss on to a ion vlo ation after 
tion has been revoked, and Lhere is no Idaho 
l le 33(o that creates a ana ogous ri to thdraw 
an admission. I d. , the court never address if the 
fendanL d thdraw he admission, he 
cause he att t do s t l , the court had ost 
uri ct on .. 
Another u is cti s determined that ithdrawal of 
an ssion to a ti vi ation is an available 
e v. Ha s, 39 1 ' .~a 503, 912 N.E.2d 696 200 ), a 
fendant s t to wit his admission to a 
ation on the that i was involuntary. The Ha s 
court that with little case law specific to probat 
violation ssions, y would anal 
There is also noth 
does not have the authority 
in that 
to do so. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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ze and apply case law 
on that sa a Court 
In 
appl e to i 11g a lty plea. In so do court 
dete the defendant was entit to e OI 
vJi thdraw his admission. See Exhibir: C. s larly, in 
evaluating a defendant movi11g to withdraw his a ssion to a 
tion violation, This Court should do the same. 
Argument 
In s case, this Court has power to set aside the 
tion olati based diffe autho t .. First, the 
court y all en is admission o 
tion violat a a ogy~ to t cedure ln I Cr nal 
3 c because ' wou rrect fest i stlce. See also 
e . Harris, 3 09 . Allen 
of r that period of t 
he has ied t ter:ns t on other than his self 
scl sed admissior, o dri ng beers rather y on his 
The event s d ave beer, racte z as minor and 
dea +- his probation officer wit d scretior,ary t r, 
the matter vJas rt as a formal ion violation 
It is probab y undi ed t t the elation was nor. 
Probation was cant nued in t s case whi Mr. Allen served 
several weekends in jail for the elation. Al L"1r. 1\ll en 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM PROBATION VIOLATION -8-
0 22 
to withdraw s ssion s not fo r any case law, 
rule, or statut ry ision and should be done s Court. 
Idato C:c na Rule 33(c) allows for the withdraw of a 
guilty p ea to correct manifest i ustice. Manifest injustice 
would result this case if Mr. len s not afforded the 
opportunity under Idaho Cede § 19- 604 to have his case dismissed 
because he entered an ss on to one occasion of drink 
during is -ciona period. ndeed, ethers who have tted 
c their robat on f r he s qua l y for 
§ 19-2604 relief s t fficer dea with the 
v c ation s rather than pursuing a 
p on vio at +- The matter could have 
ust as eas 1 been deal t Had it been s , this 
argurnent wou d necess r 
The leg.:i_s at intended ~ t Idaho Code § 19 604 be 
utilized by defendan s to encourage them to abide ion 
and ult -rely have convict ens set as de to aid in their 
itat fut re. Al . Allen to wi is 
It is resting to note that -cne current version of 
Idaho Code § 19-2604 places a lot of scret th Probation & 
Parole on whether a probationer ll ultimate y be granted a 
di ssal based on how the probation officer deals with a minor 
elation, i.e., the sition of scretionary time or going 
to Court. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM PROBATION VIOLATION -9-
3 
ss pursuant to I c nal e 33(c) and appl ng for 
§ 9-2604 re ief would rrect ma fest i ustice i t s case. 
This court has the power and aut ty to di ss the case, 
even without isit the withdraw or conversion of the admission 
to the violation, because the court has the rent 
power to di ss hist r cally and uant to Idaho law. As 
expressed above, the court should se history common sense to 
effectuate dismissa appropriate. The court has 
t tionall ssessed e inherent authority t ctate a case 
hat the rsee, See 
Ha e' cifically 
Rule 48 of the Idaho Cr~inal Rules 
court's di ssa power is lsc rized in Rule 8 of 
the Crirninal les where a c rt is authoriz 0 ss a 
case " r any other reason" when a court udes t dismissal 
wi serve the ends f ustice and the effective stration 
of the court's bus ness. Allowing Mr. Allen the ability to have 
his case dismissed meets both requirements because it furthers 
the goal of rehabil tation and serves the ends of justice. 
Conclusion 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM PROBATION VIOLATION -10-
0 4 
s Court has the power to di ss t s case and shou 
exerc se thaL author y n this case. As the court stated, 
'' [a is more han just a finder of fact or an executioner 
of the inexorable rule of law. deally, he is a so the keeper of 
the conscience of the law." at 240. In ing with the 
spirit of law and the goal of rehabilitation, this Court should 
seL aside Mr. Allen's admiss to a tion violation. 
DATED t s of Ol2. 
AMENDOLA & DOTY, PLLC 
Attorne Defendant 
a 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY hat on t of st, 2012, I 
caused LO se a true and of 
the method indicated be ow, and addressed to the 
.S. Mail BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
l27 S. FIRST AVENUE 






Gcyty I. Amendola 
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Ove Iv1ail 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS20495 
This bill would modify the class of cases in which courts may exercise their discretion to set aside 
convictions, or reduce felony convictions to misdemeanors. Idaho Code § 19-2604 now permits 
persons who have been placed on probation to have their convictions set aside if they have at 
all times complied with the terms of probation, or if they have graduated from a drug court or 
mental health court and have complied with all the terms of probation during any subsequent 
period of probation. The court has discretion to grant this relief or not, and the court can set 
aside the conviction only if it is convinced that such action is compatible with the public interest. 
Persons who have been placed on retained jurisdiction and later placed on probation may have 
their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors if they satisfy these conditions. Judges have 
frequently encountered cases where a defendant cannot be granted this relief because of a minor or 
isolated violation of the terms of probation, ofien occurring early in the probationary period. These 
sometimes include cases where the violation was not considered serious enough to warrant the filing 
of a probation violation charge. This bill would remove the requirement that defendants must at 
all times comply with the terms of probation to be eligible for relief. Jt would amend the statute to 
slate that a defendant is eligible for relief if the court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, 
any violation of the terms of probation in a probation violation proceeding. It would also provide 
courts the option, where a defendant was placed on probation, of reducing the felony conviction to 
a misdemeanor. The court could grant relief only upon a finding that such action was compatible 
with the public interest. Providing a chance for such defendants to have their convictions set aside 
wouid give them an added incentive to abide by the terms of probation and live law-abiding lives, 
and would increase their employment and educational opportunities. As provided under the current 
statute, sex offenders would not be eligible for relief. 
FISCAL NOTE 
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Wednesday, March 09, 2011 
1:30PM. 
Room EW42 
Chairman Wills, Vice Chairman Luker, Representative(s) Smith(24), Nielsen, 
Shirley, Hart, Bolz, Ellsworth, Bateman, McMillan, Perry, Sims, Burgoyne, Jaquet, 
Killen 
None 
Hal Putnam, Idaho Transportation Department, Department of Motor Vehicles; 
Lieutenant Sheldon Kelley, Idaho State Police; Michael Henderson, Legal Counsel, 
Idaho Supreme Court; Patti Tobias, Administrative Director of the Courts, Idaho 
Supreme Court; Fairy Hitchcock, Hitchcock Family Advocates; Diane Anderson, 
Citizen Advocacy Group; Eleonora Somoza, Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's 
Office; Director Brent Reinke and Tim Higgins, Idaho Department of Correction; 
Kieran Donahue, Canyon County Sheriffs Office; Jim Tibbs, Chairman, Gang 
Strategy Subcommittee, Idaho Criminal Justice Commission; Gabriel McCarthy; 
Jacquie Winter; Hanna Niehaus; Alicia Clements, Idaho Community Action 
Network; Robert L Aldridge, Trust Estate Professionals, Inc. 
Chairman Wills called the meeting to order at 1:32 p.m. 
Patti Tobias, idaho Supreme Court, explained that the Idaho Drug Court Act ·was 
adopted in 2001, followed by the Mental Health Court Act. The implementation 
of these Acts has reduced prison and jail costs, recidivism, and have changed 
offenders' lives. In order to maintain eligibility for federal funds, any person 
who was charged with, or found guilty of, certain felonies were prohibited from 
participating in these courts. However, these courts no longer receive, or plan to 
seek, any federal funds. This amendment provides a very limited exception to allow 
offenders to be admitted to a drug court, but only after consultation with the drug 
court team, and with specific consent of the prosecuting attorney. Ms. Tobias noted 
that the purpose of H 225 is to meet the special needs of returning veterans who 
are dealing with substance abuse and special mental health challenges, such as 
post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Rep. Ellsworth moved to send H 225 to the floor with a DO PASS recommendation. 
In response to questions, Ms. Tobias noted that there would not be an expansion 
of the courts, but rather a person receiving an exception would take one of the 
available vacancies. Although the word "may" is used on line 21, there are other 
statutory provisions that provide additional clarification and other guidelines defining 
what constitutes a drug court. 
Chairman Wills called for a vote on the motion to send H 225 to the floor with a 
DO PASS recommendation. Motion carried on voice vote. Rep. McMillan will 
sponsor the bill on the floor. 
Michael Henderson, Legal Counsel, Idaho Supreme Court, explained that this 
legislation would modify the class of cases in which courts may exercise their 
discretion to set aside convictions, or to reduce felony convictions to misdemeanors 
under Idaho Code § 19-2604. Certain defendants may be eligible for relief if the 













Mr. Henderson stated that providing a chance for such defendants to 
convictions set aside would increase their employment and education opportunities, 
making them productive and contributing citizens. As provided under the current 
statute, sex offenders are not eligible for relief. 
The committee discussed that the statute, as written, did not give a judge any 
discretion. Mr. Henderson noted that relief is not granted if a court finds that a 
defendant has violated his probation. Also, the language "court did not find, and the 
defendant did not admit," parallels language in other Idaho statute. 
Rep. Smith moved to send H 226 to the floor with a DO PASS recommendation. 
Fairy Hitchcock, Hitchcock Family Advocates, testified in opposition to the bill. 
She related her experience with law enforcement as well as her opinion that the 
proposed language would be ineffective. 
Chairman Wills called for a vote on the motion to send H 226 to the floor with a DO 
PASS recommendation. Motion carried on voice vote. Rep. Killen will sponsor 
the bill on the floor. 
Michael Henderson, Legal Counsel, Idaho Supreme Court, proposed two 
amendments to H 227, and requested it be sent to General Orders. The 
amendments would change the effective date to January 1, 2012, and simplify 
language in Idaho Code§§ 18-8002, subsection 3 e, and 18-8002A, subsection 2 
e. The extended effective date would give Idaho Transportation Department time to 
incorporate the changes into the Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary 
Testing ("Notice") and would educate the officers using them. The shortened 
language makes the information much easier to understand. 
Hal Putnam, Driver Records Supervisor, Idaho Transportation Department, noted 
that changing the two sections will make it easier for those officers dealing with 
suspects in the field. When someone is suspected of driving under the influence, 
and refuses to take or complete evidentiary tests, a "Notice" is given which details 
the driver's rights under these sections of code. 
In response to questions, Mr. Putnam said the new language has been discussed 
with the courts. He reviewed the draft "Notice" with the committee, which is being 
revised because of passage of H 61. 
Lieutenant Sheldon Kelly, Idaho State Police, supports the change in the 
language. He agreed that the new language is much simpler to understand. 
However, there is difficulty when officers are questioning someone who is alcohol 
impaired because they don't understand the "Notice." The more complicated the 
form, and the more information contained in the form, the greater the likelihood 
that mistakes will be made by an officer if he has to explain the information to 
an impaired suspect Lieutenant Kelly commented that it would be better if the 
administrative information could be given to defendants at a later time. 
Diane Anderson, Citizen Advocacy Group, suggested that driving without 
privileges should not be a crime if drugs and/or alcohol are not involved and she 
argued that the Supreme Court has so ruled. She would like to see additional 
amendments to the legislation. 
Rep. Killen moved to send H 227 to General Orders with Committee amendments 
attached. Rep. Jaquet seconded the motion. Motion carried on voice vote. Rep. 
Hart will sponsor the bill on the floor. 
HOUSE JUDICIARY, RULES, & ADMINISTRATION COMMITIEE 







Brent Reinke, Director, Idaho Department of Correction, introduced four 
who would present information regarding H 235 and answer questions: Eleonora 
Somoza, Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office; Tim Higgins, Idaho 
Department of Correction; Kieran Donahue, Canyon County Sheriffs Office; 
and Jim Tibbs, Chairman, Gang Strategy Subcommittee, Idaho Criminal Justice 
Commission. 
Director Reinke reported that the legislation was drafted by a group of eighty-five 
stakeholders, and the intent of the legislation is to give judges more discretion 
when sentencing an offender whose crime either promoted or was a part of gang 
activity. He also stated that the current sentencing structure is not a deterrent 
to gang members. 
In response to questions, Mr. Donahue stated that there is a set of clear criteria 
that officers have to adhere to, including type of clothing and documented database 
information, when determining whether a suspect is involved in gang activity. He 
also noted that gang activity is on the rise in Idaho, most notably Idaho Falls and 
Twin Falls. Outlying areas are putting together task forces. Females, including 
those underage, are often exploited by gang members, both male and female. 
Gang members also use juveniles for illegal activity, thinking juveniles are able 
to "slide" through the judicial system. 
Ms. Somoza explained how the enhancement penalty may be used by judges for 
the indeterminate portion of an offender's sentence. 
Diane Anderson, Citizen Advocacy Group, testified in opposition to the bill. She 
said that placing juveniles in prison is detrimental to society. While in prison, 
juveniles are taught how to be better criminals by other offenders. She stressed 
that juveniles deserve alternatives to being in jail. 
Rep. Bateman moved to send H 235 to the floor with a DO PASS recommendation. 
Motion carried on voice vote. Chairman Wills will sponsor the bill on the floor. 
Chairman Wills turned the meeting over to Vice Chairman Luker. 
Robert L. Aldridge, Trust and Estate Professionals of Idaho, Inc., presented S 
1121 He stated that last year Congress passed a retroactive federal estate tax 
revision. He also explained what renunciation means as it pertains to bequests. 
The proposed legislation would apply only to decedents whose death occurred in 
2010, and would not cause any changes to Idaho state taxes. 
In response to questions, Mr. Aldridge stated that it would be difficult to place a 
sunset clause in the bill because it could take years before complex estates are 
settled. The Legislature could take a look at removing the language in the future; 
however, appeals can extend the administration for several more years. 
Rep. Jaquet moved to sendS 1121 to the floor with a DO PASS recommendation. 
Motion carried on voice vote. Rep. Jaquet will sponsor the bill on the floor. 
There being no further business to come before the committee, the meeting was 
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SENATE JUDICIARY & RULES COMMITTEE 
Wednesday, March 16, 2011 
1:30 P.M. 
Room WW54 
Chairman Darrington, Vice Chairman Vick, Senators Davis, Lodge, McKague, 
Mortimer, Nuxoll, Bock, and LeFavour 
The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained with 
the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and will then be 
located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services Library. 
Chairman Darrington called the meeting to order at 1 :35 p.m. 
Relating to Motor Vehicle Registration and License Plates (for the Transportation 
Committee) 
Senator Lodge made a motion to send RS 20567 to print. Senator Mortimer 
seconded the motion. The motion carried by voice vote. 
Relating to the Idaho Drug Court and Mental Health Court Act- Patti Tobias, 
Administrative Director of the Courts, explained this bill amends the provision of the 
original act that prohibits participation in drug court by any person who is charged 
with or found guilty of a felony crime of violence or a felony in which the person 
used a firearm or deadly weapon. In 2001, this provision was necessary to maintain 
eligibility for federal drug court funds, but today our drug courts do not receive 
these federal funds. She explained there was a very limited exception added to 
this bill to allow an offender who is charged with or convicted of a crime of violence 
to participate in a drug court. She further explained that a person could only be 
admitted to drug court if; 1) after consultation with the drug court team, and 2) with 
the specific consent of the prosecuting attorney. Specifically, Ms. Tobias continued, 
the purpose of H 225 today is to meet the special needs of returning veterans and 
permit the establishment of veteran's courts, veteran's treatment courts, or veteran's 
treatment calendar. The Idaho Criminal Justice system is seeing an increasing 
number of returning veterans with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and they 
are being booked into the jail and often charged with crimes of violence. This will 
permit Idaho judges to provide some limited exceptions to meet the special needs 
of Idaho's veterans by permitting them to participate in Idaho's drug courts. 
Vice Chairman Vick asked if the court was given too much jurisdiction. Ms. 
Tobias said no, because the drug court team and the prosecuting attorney must 
consent before the judge would consider the participation. 
Senator Mortimer made a motion to send H 225 to the Senate floor with a do 
pass recommendation. Senator Lodge seconded the motion. The motion carried 




Relating to Suspension of Judgment and Sentence - Michael Hende 
Legal Counsel for the Courts, explained this bill would provide that a defendant can 
ask to have his conviction set aside, or to have his felony conviction reduced to 
a misdemeanor, if there was no finding or admission of a violation of the terms 
of probation during a probation violation proceeding. This would ensure that 
defendants who committed minor violations of the terms of probation, that did not 
even merit a probation violation proceeding, would continue to be eligible for relief. 
He further stated this will give defendants an added incentive to continue to make 
an effort to adhere to the terms of probation and will increase the chances for 
rehabilitated defendants to obtain employment and take advantage of educational 
opportunities. Sex offenders would continue to be ineligible for any relief under the 
statute, and the defendant would always have the burden of showing that setting 
aside his conviction or reducing it to a misdemeanor is compatible with the public 
interest. 
Senator Davis expressed concern with the language of the bill if the probation 
violation was nominal. He wondered if there would be a chance for the conviction 
to be set aside, even if the violation was a minor act, because a defendant had 
admitted the violation or if the court had discovered the violation. Mr. Henderson 
explained the language about admission or discovery of a violation was to duplicate 
existing statutes with language containing the phrase "plea of guilty or a finding of 
guilt" and implying that an admission is formerly placed on the record. Senator 
LeFavour asked what the consequence would be for these individuals to stay on 
the roll of IDOC and add to their case load even after a judge was comfortable to 
be done with the process. Mr. Henderson said sometimes probation officers will 
initiate the process of releasing the offender from probation if they are complying 
and have satisfied the requirements of probation. Senator LeFavour asked if it 
was possible for the parole officers to end the probation time, or under 19-2604 can 
the offender also do that. Mr. Henderson said the request could be initiated either 
by the offender or the probation officer. 
Fairy Hitchcock said she found this bill interesting, but is not in favor of passing it 
because of her experiences in the Ada County Courthouse this past summer. She 
referred to a five day probation violation hearing with three probation officers sitting 
in the courtroom. The judge held the case in chambers for six weeks before she 
decided to commute the defendant's sentence. 
Michael Henderson said that the decision to grant a withheld judgment would take 
place initially at the sentencing hearing. At a later time the court would decide 
whether to set aside the finding of guilt so that the defendant would not have a 
conviction on the record. Senator Davis said that the way the language is written 
now the prosecuting attorney could argue that the defendant is not entitled to have 
the conviction set aside because the defendant did not comply with the conditions 
of probation at all times, even though the prosecuting attorney did not ask the court 
to find that the defendant violated his probation. The language of the bill seems 
to be a substantial improvement in enforcing the rights of defendants who have 
received a suspended sentence or withheld judgment. Mr. Henderson said that 
was correct Under the current language the prosecuting attorney could come back 
even after five years and argue that during the period of probation the defendant 
violated a condition of probation and therefore is ineligible for relief. 
Senator LeFavour made a motion to send H 226 to the Senate floor with a do 
pass recommendation. Vice Chairman Vick seconded the motion. The motion 
carried by voice vote. 
SENATE JUDICIARY & RULES COMMITTEE 
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s 1154 Relating to the Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Com 
Right-To-Know Act - Stephen Bywater, Representative of the Idaho Criminal 
Justice Commission, continued his presentation from Monday's meeting. Chairman 
Darrington told the committee that the package before them was the proposed 
amendments to the bill and changes were in red. Mr. Bywater went through the 
amendments to address the committee's concerns and comments. He said eight 
sections in S 1154 are affected as follows: 
1. 18-9303 {17), 'Violent sexual predator" is redefined as a person designated 
as such by the sex offender classification board where such designation has 
not been removed by judicial action or otherwise. 
2. 18-8304 eliminates the misdemeanor from statute per Mr. McCarthy's 
suggestion. 
3. 18-8307 brings back the existing language regarding the violent sexual 
predator quarterly registration obligation and the address verification. 
4. 18-8308 brings back the language of mail notification of address and 
electronic monitoring of violent sexual predators. 
5. 18-8310 brings back "an offender designated as a violent sexual predator" is 
not eligible for release from registration requirements. 
6. 83-8312 changes the board from 8 to 9 members; one member of the board 
shall be a representative of the public. 
7. 18-8323 changes "includes" to "limited to" to make clear what appears on the 
public web site. 
8. 20-219: the proposed amendments are no longer needed, and this section 
should be removed in its entirety. Wording of the statute as it stands is 
appropriate. 
Questions from the senators regarding the fiscal note, future VSP designation, and 
meeting times of the board members were clarified by Mr. Bywater. 
MOTION: Senator Bock made a motion to sendS 1154 to the 14th Order for amendment. 
Senator Nuxoll seconded the motion. The motion carried by voice vote. 
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Background: Defendant filed motion to withdra·w 
his admission to violating his probation for his ori-
ginal conviction of burglary to a motor vehicle. The 
Circuit Court of Du Page County. R. 
Thompson. L denied motion. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Appellate Court. Zenoff. PJ.. held 
that: 
( l) \Vithdrawal of admission to violation 
was available for defendant. and 
(2) trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
motion without considering evidence and argu-
ments on its merits. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
defendant's motion to withdraw his admission to vi-
olating his probation for his original conviction of 
burglary to a motor vehicle without considering 
evidence and arguments on its merits: court 
wrongly detennined that withdrawal of admission 
was not available remedy and neYer heard eYidence 
on merits of motion. and court neyer considered 
meaning of tenn "concurrent" in parties' sentencing 
agreement. never inquired into allegations of inef-
fective assistance of counsel. and did not consider 
whether any mistake of fact made defendant's ad-
missiOn to violation involuntary. U SC.A. 
ConstAmend. 6; Sup.CtRules. Rule 
**698 Timmas A. Deputy DefendeL R. 
Christopher White (both Court-appointed). Otllce 
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Joseph E. Birkett, Du Page County State's 
\Vheaton, Robert l Bidem1an. David E. Mannchen. 
State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor. 
for the People. 
Presiding Justice ZENOFF delivered the of 
the court: 
***211 *504 Ivan B. Harris appeals the denial 
of his motion to withdraw his admission to violat-
ing his probation for his original conYiction of 
burglary to a motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony 
ILCS 51l9~l (West 2004)). He contends that his 
admission was involuntary because his sentence did 
not include approYal for impact incarceration, in vi-
olation of the parties' agreement that the sentence 
would be concurrent with a Will County sentence 
that included such approval. Because the trial court 
\Vrongly dete1mined that withdrawal of the admis-
sion was not an available remedy and, as a result. 
never heard evidence on the merits of Harris's mo-
we reverse and remand for further proceed-
ings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On October 12, 2005, Harris pleaded guilty un-
der a plea agreement and was sentenced to 24 
months' probation. On December 5, 2006, the State 
filed a petition to revoke Harris's probation, al-
leging that on October 3, 2006. Harris committed 
offenses in Will County and that he failed to report 
to the probation department. 
On March 28, 2007, Harris entered into an 
agreement to admit to the allegations in exchange 
for a sentence of seven years' incarceration 
·'concurrent" with the sentence in the Will County 
case, \Vith credit for 177 days. The Will County 
sentence included approval for placement in impact 
incarceration. However, the Du Page County *505 
agreement as stated to the trial court was silent on 
whether it required approval for impact incarcera-
tion in order for the sentence in this case to be 
·'concurrent" with the sentence in Will County. 
Under Supreme Court Rule 402A(a) (21 0 Ill.2d 
R. 402A(a)), the court admonished Harris that, by 
admitting the violations. he would give up his right 
to call witnesses at a hearing that \\ ould require the 
State to prove the violations by a preponderance of 
the evidence. The court also admonished Harris of 
the requirements of mandatory supervised release. 
HoweYer, the court never confirmed Harris's under-
standing of the petition, and it advised Harris that 
the sentencing range for the original Class 2 felony 
was 3 to 14 years, >vhen at the plea hearing it stated 
the range as 3 to 7 years. See 730 ILCS 5 5~8-l 
(a)(5) (West 2004). The court did not inquire 
whether any coercion or promises apart from the 
agreement influenced the admission. 210 Ill.2d R. 
402A(b). The court also never heard a specific fac-
tual basis for the admission. 210 Ill.2d R. 402A(c). 
The court imposed the seven-year tenn and told 
Harris that, should he want to appeal, he would be 
required to first file within 30 days a written motion 
to withdraw the admission. 
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On April 10, 2007, Harris wrote a letter to the 
trial court, stating that he had received***212 
**699 impact incarceration in Will County and 
needed approval for impact incarceration in the cur-
rent case in order for his sentence to be concurrent 
with his Will County sentence. On April 25, 2007. 
Harris wrote another letter to the trial court. stating 
that a box for impact incarceration on the senten-
cing form had not been checked and asking that the 
order be corrected. The record confirms that the 
sentencing form has a box for the judge to check 
when impact incarceration is approved. 
On April 26, 2007. Harris filed a motion to 
withdraw his admission. pursuant to Supreme Coun 
Rule 604(d) (210 Ill.2d R. alleging that he 
did not knowingly. intelligently. and voluntarily 
waive his right to a hearing on the petition to re-
voke his probation and that he did not fully under-
stand the trial court's admonitions. The State moved 
to strike the motion, alleging that Rule was 
not applicable. 
On June 6. a V\as held on the mo-
tion to strike. Harris appeared with new counsel 
who told the court that they wished to evid-
ence that. based on the advice of his attor-
ney. Harris believed that his sentence would in-
clude approval for impact incarceration. Harris's 
new counsel said that he would call Harris's previ-
ous attorney to testif). The trial court continued the 
matter to allow Hanis to supplement his motion. 
On July 9, 2007, another hearing \vas held, and 
Harris filed a supplemental motion, reasserting his 
previous contentions and adding *506 that his ori-
ginal counsel was ineffective for failing to inform 
him that the sentence would not include approval 
for impact incarceration. He included an affidavit 
stating that, from discussions with counsel, his un-
derstanding was that the sentence proposed under 
his agreement would include approval for impact 
incarceration. 
The State argued that withdrawal of the admis-
sion was not the proper remedy and that Harris 
should file an appeal. Without hearing any evidence 
on the matter, the trial court responded that the is-
sue of impact incarceration never arose and that 
"there was never a sentence, there was never a con-
templation, there was never an error.'· The court 
said that it had read Harris's letter about checking 
the box on the form and said. "'that was never, ever 
an issue, pretrial or sentencing." The court then 
found that the State's position was well taken. held 
that withdrawal of the admission was not the proper 
remedy. and denied Harris's motion. Harris appeals. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Harris contends that he should be allowed to 
withdraw his admission because his counsel misin-
fonned him that his sentence would include approv-
al for impact incarceration. The State argues that. 
because Rule 604( d) is inapplicable, the trial court 
had no obligation to hear evidence on Harris's mo-
tion. In the alternative. it contends that Harris failed 
to show that he \\as entitled to withdraw his admis-
siOn. 
A. to Move to Withdraw the Admission 
[ J J Although the trial court made statements 
about the merits of the motion to withdraw the ad-
mission. it ultimately concluded that withdrawal of 
the admission was not the proper The 
State contends that the court was correct, arguing 
that Rule 604(d) is inapplicable***213 **700 and 
that Harris thus did not have the right to a hearing 
on his motion. 
FN 1 The court had advised defendant at 
the time of his admission that filing such a 
motion was a prerequisite to an appeal. 
[2][3][4] We review a legal question de novo. 
See People v. Hall, J 98 lll.2d J 73. 177. 260 Ill. Dec. 
198. 760 N.E.2d 971 C:WOl). In the context of a ne-
gotiated guilty plea, a defendant must file a motion 
to withdraw the plea within 30 days in order to pre-
serve the right to appeal. See 21 0 Ill.2d R. 604( d). 
But Rule 604( d) "makes no express reference to an 
appeal from a conviction or sentence imposed after 
a defendant on probation has admitted the allega-
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tions of the petition to revoke the probation." 
People v. 94 Ill.App.3d 516, 518, 50 
Ill.Dec. 97. 418 N.E.2d 1091 (1981). Thus. a de-
fendant who has admitted violating his or her pro-
bation is not required to move to withdraw the *507 
admission before appealing the order revoking the 
probation. See Stevens. 94 Ill.App.3d at 518. 50 
Ill.Dec. 97. 418 N.E.2d 1091: see also v. 
Butcher, 288 lll.App.3d 120, 122-23, 223 lll.Dec. 
487, 679 N.E.2d 1260 (1997). However, that a de-
fendant is not required to move to withdraw the ad-
mission does not mean that he or she may not seek 
to do so or that an appeal is the only available rem-
edy. Instead. such a motion, while not a prerequis-
ite to an appeal, is permissible. See v. 
165 Ill.2d 66, 78, 208 Ill.Dec. 318. 649 N.E.2d 374 
(!995): see also Butcher. 288 at 123. 223 
lll.Dec. 487. 679 N.E.2d 1260 (observing that de-
fendant could have moved to withdraw an admis-
sion to a probation violation in the trial court and 
put on evidence that he was misled by discussion 
about an agreement). 
In the supren1e court held that a defend-
ant's admission to a violation of his conditional dis-
charge did not require admonishments about 
a motion to withdraw the admission or reconsider 
the sentence before appealing. The court 
however, that a defendant may file such a motion if 
he or she desires to do so. stating: "The * * * con-
cern for judicial efficiency is adequately safe-
guarded by permitting. but not a defend-
ant to first file a motion to vacate or reconsider the 
sentence he has received because of revocation of 
his conditional discharge." (Emphases in original.) 
Tujie, 165 Ill.2d at 78, 208 lli.Dec. 318. 649 N.E.2d 
374. The revocation of a defendant's conditional 
discharge is substantially similar to the revocation 
of a defendant's probation, and they are governed 
by the same statutory requirements. in re JE.AJ. Y.. 
289 Ill.App.3d 389. 391, 224 Ill.Dec. 890, 682 
N.E.2d 451 (1997). Thus, Tufte applies equally to 
probation revocation hearings. in re JE.M. Y, 289 
lll.App.3d at 391.224 IILDec. 890,682 N.E.2d 451. 
Here, although Harris \vas not required to move 
to withdraw his admission in order to file an appeal 
alleging that the admission was he was 
allowed to use the procedure if he desired to do so. 
Thus, the trial court erred when it detem1ined that 
withdrawal of the admission was not an available 
remedy. 
B. Entitlement to Withdrawal of the Admission 
Harris argues that the record shows that he is 
entitled to withdraw his admission because he was 
operating under a mistake of fact and his counsel 
was ineffective for failing to adequately inform him 
of the consequences of his admission or the nature 
of the agreement. The State responds that, even if 
Harris could seek to withdraw his admission, there 
is no merit to his claim. because he stated his un-
derstanding of the agreement and failed to show in-
effective assistance of counsel. 
[5] There is little recent case law specific to ad-
missions to probation violations. In general, 
however, the rules and requirements of probation 
revocation are ***214 **701 sirnilar to 
those for guilty plea hearings. *508 See v. 
Ellis. 375 IlLApp.3d 041, 1046. 314 Ill.Dec. 615. 
874 '!'J.E.2d 980 (2007): see also 210 Ill.2d R. 402A 
(codifying the admonishments required for due pro-
cess \Vhen there is an admission to a probation viol-
ation). Thus, in the absence of cases specific to the 
withdrawal of admissions to probation violations, 
we apply case law applicable to the withdrawal of 
guilty pleas when considering Harris's contention 
that his admission was involuntary. 
(6][7]l8] A probationer is entitled to due pro-
cess at a revocation hearing. v. 
411 U.S. 778, 781-82. 93 S.Ct. !756. 1759~60, 36 
L.Ed.2d 656. 661-62 (1973). Due process requires 
that an admission to violating probation be volun-
tary, but only the minimum requirements of due 
process must be followed in a probation revocation 
proceeding. See People v. Goleash, 31 I Ili.App.3d 
949, 956, 244 lll.Dec. 598. 726 N.E.2d 194 (2000); 
in re VT.. 306 Ill.App.3d 817. 819. 239 Ill.Dec. 
869, 715 N.E.2d 314 (!999). Rule 402A provides 
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admonitions to be given before a court can accept 
an admission to a violation. 21 0 Ill.2d R. 402A. 
"[T]he goal of the Rule 402A admonitions is 'to en-
sure that (the] defendant understood his admission, 
the rights he was waiving, and the potential con-
sequences of his admission.' " Ellis. 375 lll.App.3d 
at 1046, 314 Ill.Dec. 615, 874 N.E.2d 980, quoting 
People v. Dennis, 354 Ill.App.3d 491, 496. 290 
lll.Dec. 123, 820 N.E.2d 1190 (2004). 
[9][10][1 1] In the context of a motion to with-
draw a guilty plea, "[t]he misapprehension of law 
or fact goes to the question of whether the plea was 
voluntarily and intelligently made." People v. Rut-
ledge, 212 Ill.App.3d 31, 34. 156 Ill.Dec. 87. 570 
N .E.2d 563 (1991 ). " 'In the absence of substantial 
objective proof showing that a defendant's mistaken 
impressions were reasonably justified. subjective 
impressions alone are not sufficient grounds on 
which to vacate a guilty plea.· " 
358 III.App.3d 447, 45L 294 IJI.Dec. 
N.E.2d 696 {2005), quoting v. 
lll.App.3d 469. 475. 184 lli.Dec. 34. 612 
910 (1993). ''The defendant bears the burden of 
proving that his or her mistaken impression was ob-
jectively reasonable under the circumstances exist-
ing at the time of the plea.'' (Emphasis omitted.) 
358 lll.App.3d at 45 L 294 Ill. Dec. 746. 
831 ?'J.E.2d 696. 
[12][13] A plea will also be rendered involun-
tary when the prosecution breaches its promise with 
respect to an executed plea agreement, causing the 
defendant to plead guilty on a false premise. 
v. A/gee. 228 lll.App.3d 401, 403, 169 lli.Dec. 497, 
591 N.E.2d 1001 (1992). Further, "[a] plea of guilty 
is deemed voluntary only if it is given with the as-
sistance of competent counsel." A/gee, 228 
lii.App.3d at 404, 169 III.Dec. 497, 591 N.E.2d 1001. 
[14][15] "In reviewing a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we apply the familiar two-
part test established in Strickland v. Washington. 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984)." People v. 178 Ill.2d 509. 518. 227 
lll.Dec. 395, 687 N.E.2d 877 (l 
under a defendant must 
"To prevail 
that his at-
torney's assistance was both deficient and prejudi-
cial. More precisely, a defendant must show that his 
attorney's *509 assistance was objectively unreas-
onable under prevailing professional norms, and 
that there is a 'reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the resu It of the 
proceeding would have been different.' " Cuny. 
178 Ill.2d at 518~ J 9, 227 IlL Dec. 395. 687 N.E.2d 
877. quoting Strickland 466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064. 2068. 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 698. ·'A 
criminal defendant has the constitutional ***215 
**702 right to be reasonabZv infonned with respect 
to the direct consequences of accepting or rejecting 
a plea otTer.'' (Emphasis in original.) Currr, 178 
ill.2d at 528. 227 IILDec. 395. 687 N.E.2d 877. 
When the competency of counsel is specifically 
challenged in a postjudgment motion, the trial court 
must make an adequate inquiry into the matter. See 
v. Friend. 34! Ili.App.3d !39. 142. 276 
!ll.Dec. 68. 793 N.E.2d 927 
1 6 J \Ve revie\\' the trial court's decision for an 
abuse of discretion. See r Pullen 192 lll.2d 
36. 40. 248 Ill.Dec. 237. 733 N.E.2d 1235 ). 
·'A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is 
fancifuL or unreasonable. or where no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." v. 377 lli.App.3d 
548, 316 Ili.Dec. 63L 879 N.E.2d 1019 (2007) 
. Although both pal1ies ask us to resolve the merits 
of Harris's motion. when no evidence was presented 
and we cannot say as a matter of record \vhat the 
outcome would have been if evidence had been 
heard, a remand is appropriate. See 288 
Ill.App.3d at 123. 223 Ill.Dec. 487, 679 N.E.2d 1260. 
[ 17] Here, although the agreement provided for 
a ·'concurrent" sentence, it is uncertain whether the 
·'concunent" sentence would necessarily include 
approval for impact incarceration. It is possible that 
the State and Hanis intended approval for impact 
incarceration to be included when they agreed that 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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the sentence was to be "concurrent" with the Will 
County sentence that already included such approv-
al. They also could have assumed that there was no 
need to clarifY that point to the trial court. Another 
possibility is that Harris's counsel informed him 
that the agreement included approval for impact in-
carceration when it actually did not. It is equally 
possible, however, that impact incarceration was 
never considered at alL that the parties contem-
plated only the length of incarceration without re-
gard for the type of incarceration, and that the con-
sequences were accurately conveyed to Harris. Re-
gardless. the actual facts cannot be gleaned from 
the record partly because. at the time of the admis-
sion, the trial court gave minimal admonishments 
that did not explore Harris's understanding of the 
agreement other than by confirming that it was as 
the State presented-a term of imprisonment 
"concurrent" with the imprisonment in Will 
County. Had further inquiry been made, as required 
by Supreme Court Rule 402A(b) (21 0 Ill.2d R. 
402A(b)), any misunderstanding might have been 
revealed. Cf People v. Robinson. 157 lll.App.3d 
l!O IlLDec. 19. 510 N.E.2d !050 (1987) 
("If a plea of guilty is to have binding effect or 
is to be given any subsequent the extensive 
*510 and exhaustive admonitions by the cir-
cuit court * * * and acknowledged pctltloner 
must be held to ovenvhelm petitioner's current as-
sertion that he entered his plea involuntarily''). We 
are not suggesting a bright-line rule by which the 
specific terms of an agreement must be presented to 
the court. But here. the tertns \vere neither suffi-
ciently clear nor sufficiently determined the 
court, making a hearing necessary to detem1ine 
whether there is merit to Harris's motion. 
When Harris did not receive a recommendation 
for impact incarceration. he specifically raised the 
matter in his motion to withdraw the admission. He 
then amended that motion to specifically include al-
legations of ineffective assistance of counseL But, 
despite his indication that he would call his previ-
ous attorney to testifY about the agreement, the 
court did not hear evidence about Harris's conten-
tions. Instead, the court stated that impact incarcer-
ation***216 **703 was never specifically men-
tioned at the probation revocation hearing and then 
held that withdrawal of the admission was not an 
available remedy. The record reflects that the court 
never considered the meaning of the term 
·'concurrent" in the agreement, never inquired into 
the allegations of ineffective assistance of counseL 
and did not consider whether any mistake of fact 
made Harris's admission involuntary. Accordingly. 
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
Harris's motion without considering evidence and 
arguments on its merits. 
The State argues that. even if approval for im-
pact incarceration were given. there is no proof that 
Harris \\Ould actually receive it and his motion can 
be denied on that basis. However, the issue is 
whether Harris's admission \vas involuntary when 
he believed that approval for impact incarceration 
was included in the agreement-not whether he 
would actually receive impact incarceration if that 
approval were See generally 178 
Ili.2d at 53.:L IlLDec 395. 687 N.E.2d 877 (to 
show ineffective assistance in context of a plea 
agreement. a defendant need not prove that a court 
would actually accept a plea agreement). In any 
event, Harris was never an to 
present evidence of the likelihood of his placement 
in impact incarceration. because the trial court nev-
er properly considered the merits of his motion. 
IlL CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court never properly con-
sidered the merits of Harris's motion. 1.ve reverse 
and remand for the trial court to hear evidence and 
determine whether any ineffective assistance of 
counsel or misapprehension of fact made Harris's 
admission involuntary so as to allow him to with-
draw his admission. The judgment of the circuit 
*511 court of Du Page County is reversed and the 
cause remanded for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
McLAREN and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur. 
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) MEMORANDUl\1 DECISION AND ORDER 
) re: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF 
) FROM PROBATION VIOLATION AND 
LONNIE L. ALLEN, 




When faced with the aggravated circumstances presented in this case, the 
Court concludes that this is not a case where it is "compatible with the public 
interest, [to] terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of 
the defendant, and finally dismiss the case ... or [to] amend the judgment of 
conviction ... to be a misdemeanor conviction," pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
2604. Therefore, the defendant's motion for relief from probation violation and 
motion for relief under Idaho Code§ 19-2604 are denied. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 10, 2009, the defendant, Lonnie L. Allen, entered a guilty plea to the 
offense of Attempted Strangulation, a felony in violation of Idaho Code § 18-923. He was 
sentenced on January 7, 2010. The "Judgment and Commitment and Order of Probation" 
(hereafter, "Judgment") was entered on January 13, 2010. Mr. Allen was sentenced to the 
custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated for not less than one 
(1) year fixed, two (2) years indeterminate, not to exceed three (3) years total. He was granted 
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credit for 147 days served in presentence incarceration. Mr. Allen's sentence was suspended and 
he was placed on formal, supervised probation for a period of three (3) years, beginning January 
2010, until January 7, 2013, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Judgment. 
The Idaho Department of Correction, Division of Community Correction issued a Report 
of Probation Violation dated September 7, 2010, which set forth the following violations: 1 
Allegation# Rule Violated 
1 Violation of court order to 
submit to polygraph 
examination at his own 
expense at any time 
requested by his probation 
officer 
2 Violation of court order to 
not purchase, possess, or 
consume alcoholic beverages 
4 Violation of court order to 
not be present at any bar, 
lounge, tavern or on the 
premises of any place where 
the dispensing of alcohol is 
the major source of income 
Alleged Misconduct 
Mr. Allen failed to provide truthful infonnation j 
on polygraph testing as requested by his probation / 
officer. He failed a polygraph on June 8, 2010, j 
with Certified Polygraph Associates. At his I 
request, Mr. Allen was allowed to change 
polygraphers and again failed to provide truthful j 
information on August 13, 2010, in a test 
conducted by Northwest Polygraph Services. I 
Mr. Allen admitted to consuming "two or three 
draft beers" while at a business meeting in Iowa in ,. 
May of 2010, in the polygraph test dated August 
1 
13,2010. 
Mr. Allen was present at the Irish Cottage Pub, 
9853 U.S. Route 20 West, Galena, IL, on or about 
May 24, 2010. 
An evidentiary hearing on the alleged violations was held on November 16, 2010. At the 
hearing, Mr. Allen admitted Allegation 2, and the State withdrew the remaining allegations. The 
Court entered an Order Continuing Probation on January 11, 2011, which ordered that the 
probation granted to Mr. Allen on January 7, 2012, would be continued through January 7, 2013, 
upon the terms and conditions previously established, with the additional condition that Mr. 
Allen serve eight (8) days in the Bonner County Jail on weekends. 
1 The Report of Probation Violation contains only three allegations. The Allegations are numbered L 2, and 4. There is no 
Allegation 3. 
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On December 2, 2011, Mr. Allen filed a Motion to Terminate Supervised Probation, on 
the grounds that he had complied \vith the terms and conditions of his probation and supervision 
was no longer necessary. He also filed a Motion for Relief from Probation Violation, in which 
he requested that the Court set aside his admission to the probation violation and order that the 
probation violation be dismissed. Lastly, Mr. Allen filed a Motion for Relief under Idaho Code§ 
19-2604, requesting that his plea of guilty and conviction in this case be dismissed and that he be 
discharged. 
In a December 8, 2011, letter to the Court from the Idaho Department of Correction, 
Probation/Parole Officer Douglas Hall stated that he "would NOT support Mr. Allen's being 
completely discharged from any form of probation, however lbe] would have no objection if the 
Court chooses to place Mr. Allen on Unsupervised Probation for the remainder of his probation 
term." Idaho Department of Correction Letter (filed on December 13, 2011). Mr. Hall, however, 
was under the mistaken assumption that Mr. Allen had no violations during his probation. 
Mr. Allen's Motion to Terminate Supervised Probation was argued on December 20, 
2011, and the two remaining motions were vacated. After considering the evidence presented 
and the argument of counsel, the Court entered an Order Regarding Probation, which ordered that 
the supervised probation ordered on January 7, 2010, would be converted to unsupervised 
probation as of December 20, 2011. 
At a hearing on July 2, 2012, Mr. Allen's Motion to Terminate Unsupervised Probation, 
his Motion for Relief from Probation Violation, and his Motion for Relief under Idaho Code § 
19-2604 came before the Court. After considering the evidence presented and the argument of 
counsel, the Court entered an Order Regarding Probation, which granted the Motion to Terminate 
Unsupervised Probation. The unsupervised probation ordered on December 20, 2011, was 
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terminated as of July 2, 2012. The Motion for Relief from Probation Violation and Motion for 
Relief under Idaho Code§ 19-2604 were taken under advisement. On August 6, 201 Mr. Allen 
filed a Memorandum in Support of Relief from Probation Violation and an Affidavit The State 
did not respond. 
NOW, THEREFORE, after considering the evidence presented and the argument of 
counsel, this Memorandum Decision is issued. 
II. THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES 
A. Mr. Allen's Argument 
In his supporting memorandum, Mr. Allen requests that the Court set aside his admission 
to the probation violation. Mr. Allen also seeks to set aside his plea of guilty and sets forth the 
following arguments: 
I. The withdrawal of a probation violation admission is analogous to the withdrawal of a 
guilty plea under Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c). 
The Court may allow Mr. Allen to withdraw his admission to the probation violation by 
analogy to the procedure in Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c), which allows the withdrawal of a guilty 
plea. In People v. Harris, 392 Ill.App.3d 503, 912 N.E.2d 696 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 2009), an Illinois 
appellate court stated: 
In the context of a negotiated guilty plea, a defendant must file a motion to 
withdraw the plea within 30 days in order to preserve the right to appeal. See 210 
Ill.2d R. 604( d). But Rule 604( d) "makes no express reference to an appeal from a 
conviction or sentence imposed after a defendant on probation has admitted the 
allegations of the petition to revoke the probation." People v. Stevens, 94 
Ill.App.3d 516, 518, 50 Ill.Dec. 97, 418 N.E.2d 1091 (1981). Thus, a defendant 
who has admitted violating his or her probation is not required to move to 
withdraw the admission before appealing the order revoking the probation. See 
Stevens, 94 Ill.App.3d at 518, 50 Ill.Dec. 97, 418 N.E.2d 1091; see also People v. 
Butcher, 288 Ill.App.3d 120, 122-23, 223 Ill.Dec. 487, 679 N.E.2d 1260 (1997). 
However, that a defendant is not required to move to withdraw the admission does 
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not mean that he or she may not seek to do so or that an appeal is the only 
available remedy. Instead, such a motion, while not a prerequisite to an appeal, is 
permissible. See People v. Tufte, 165 Ill.2d 66, 78, 208 Ill.Dec. 318, 649 N .E.2d 
374 (1995); see also Butcher, 288 IlLApp.3d at 123, 223 Ill.Dec. 487, 679 N.E.2d 
1260 (observing that defendant could have moved to withdraw an admission to a 
probation violation in the trial court and put on evidence that he was misled by 
discussion about an agreement). 
Jd at 506-507, 912 N.E.2d at 700. 
Mr. Allen has been on probation since January of 2010. During that period of time, he 
has complied with the terms of probation other than his admission to drinking "two or three 
beers·' early in his probation. This event should have been characterized as minor and dealt with 
by Mr. Allen's probation officer with discretionary time. Instead, the matter was brought into 
court as a formal probation violation proceeding. The violation was minor because probation 
was continued this case and ML Allen served several weekends in jail as a sanction. Allowing 
Mr. Allen to withdraw his admission to the probation violation is not forbidden under any case 
law, rule, or statutory provision and should be done by this Court. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33( c) provides that "to correct manifest injustice the court after 
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw 
defendant's plea." Manifest injustice would result in this case if Mr. Allen is not afforded the 
opportunity under Idaho Code § I 9-2604 to have his case dismissed, because the violation is a 
result of his admission to one occasion of drinking during his probationary period. 
2. The Court has the inherent power to dismiss this case. 
This Court has the power and authority to dismiss this case even without the withdrawal 
of the admission of the probation violation because courts have the inherent power to dismiss, 
both historically and pursuant to Idaho law. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240, 486 P.2d 
247, 251(1971) ("[W]e perceive that the authority possessed by the courts to sentence necessarily 
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includes the power to suspend the whole or any part of that sentence in proper cases .... "). 
Moreover, the legislature has specifically authorized the judicial branch to dismiss criminal 
convictions pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2604. 
part: 
3. Dismissal is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 48. 
The Court's dismissal power is authorized in Idaho Criminal Rule 48, which provides in 
(a) Dismissal on A1otion and Notice. The court, on notice to all parties, may 
dismiss a criminal action upon its own motion or upon motion of any party upon 
either of the following grounds: 
(2) For any other reason, the court concludes that such dismissal will serve 
the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court's business. 
LC.R. 48(a)(2). (Emphasis supplied). 
The dismissal of Mr. Allen's case meets both requirements, as it furthers the goal of 
rehabilitation and serves the ends of justice. 
B. The State's ''No Objection" 
At the July 2, 2012, hearing, the prosecution stated that it had no objection to the granting 
of relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604. The prosecution further stated that it would defer to the 
Court's judgment with respect to the determination of whether to dismiss the probation entirely. 
See Court 1'vfinutes of July 2, 2012, Hearing, at p. 2. 
III. APPLICABLE LAW 
Idaho Code § 19-2604, which governs the discharge of a defendant and the amendment of 
the judgment, provides in part: 
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, 
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that: 
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(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation 
violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of 
probation; or 
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized 
drug court program or mental health court program and during any period of 
probation that may have been served following such graduation, the court did not 
find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that 
the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; 
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer 
cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the 
public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or 
conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the 
defendant or may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the 
custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" 
for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended 
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. This shall apply to 
the cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by the 
court before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. 
The final dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring 
the defendant to his civil rights. 
LC § 19-2604. (Emphasis supplied). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
In considering Mr. Allen's request to have his criminal conviction for attempted 
strangulation dismissed, the presentence report (hereafter, "PSI") was reviewed. The review 
occurred with a level of skepticism concerning the PSI writer's comments and opinions, as the 
writer, Kendra Nikolaus, the presentence investigator, did engage in rank speculation, including 
her comment: "In considering all of the physical evidence on the victim, coupled with his 
obsession of recording himself having intercourse with women, it is unknown what other crimes 
he may have committed." PSI, at p. 10. Comments such as this, and others, were disregarded 
and not considered. As the parties are aware, this Court also ignored Ms. Nikolaus' 
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recommendation that Mr. Allen "be housed within the Idaho Department of Correction." PSL at 
p. 11. 
In considering Mr. Allen's request to set aside his admission to the probation violation, 
the portion of the court file dealing with the probation violation was reviewed. 
The legal issues presented concerning whether or not the Court has express, implicit, or 
inherent authority to allow Mr. Allen's admission to a probation violation to be withdrawn, and 
thus allow the dismissal of his conviction for attempted strangulation, presents a case of first 
impression for this Court. The decision in this case, however. does not turn on an examination of 
the legal theories as to whether the Court has the power to grant the relief requested. 
The Court is cognizant of the criminal justice system's goal of rehabilitation, and takes 
that goal into consideration making a decision on the issues presented. \Vhen faced with the 
aggravated circumstances presented in this case as set forth in the PSI, however, this is not a case 
where it is "compatible with the public interesL [to] terminate the sentence or set aside the plea 
of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case ... or [to] amend the 
judgment of conviction ... to be a misdemeanor conviction," pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604. 
In this case, Mr. Allen's version of the facts as set forth in the police reports was not 
credible. During sentencing, consideration was given to the aggravating and mitigating factors, 
including the effect of the crime on the victim, the nature of Mr. Allen, his attitude, credibility, 
remorse, and mental state. Of particular concern was the severity of Mr. Allen's crime of attempted 
strangulation and the circumstances surrounding it. i\fter considering Mr. Allen's actions and the 
way he accomplished the crime, it was necessary to impose a sentence that serves the primary 
objective of sentencing, which is the protection of society, as well as the related goal of deterring 
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the commission of similar violent crimes in the community by other potential defendants who are 
similarly situated. 
Although Mr. Allen may have made strides to become a better citizen, in the discretion of 
the Court, it appears that the severity of the crime and the method of its accomplishment militates 
against either the dismissal of the judgment of conviction or a reduction to a misdemeanor. 
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE for the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion for Relief from 
Probation Violation and Motion for Relief under Idaho Code§ 19-2604 are hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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In accordance with Rule 32(i) of the Idaho Co~rt 
Administrative , the Defendant Lonnie L. Al:en, through his 
atto~ney Gary I. Amendola of the law rm of AMENDOLA & DOIY, 
P~LC, moves this Court ~or an order s ing all of the re in 
th:Ls case. 
This Motion will be supported by a Memorandum and/or 
Affidavit(s) filed before a hearing on this Mo~ion. ~ 
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at the hearing on this Motion. The Defendant requests one hour 
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Atto~neys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE Of IDAHO, I~ AND fOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
?laintiff, 
vs. 
LONNIE L. .2\LLEN I 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR-09-5187 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
The Defendant Lonnie E. Allen, through his at~orney Ga 
-~~endola of Amendola & Doty, PLLC, files the following Me~orandum 
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of this CourL'S Augus~ 
27, 2012 Memorandum Decision and Order re: Defendant 1 s Motion for 
Relief from Probation Violation and Motion for Relief under Idaho 
Code§ 19-2604: 
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In t:roduction 
In the August 27, 2012 Memorandum Decision and Order re: 
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Probation Violation and Motion 
for Relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604 {the Memorandum Decision 
and Order), ~his Court stated its reasons for denying Mr. Allen 
rel f as follows: 
The Cour~ is cognizant of the criminal justice sys~em's goal 
of rehabilitation, and takes that goal into consideration ln 
making a decision on the issues presenLed. When faced th Lhe 
aggravated circurr,stances prese:r:ted in this case as set forth in 
the PSI, however, this is not a case where it is "compatible with 
the public interest, [to] terminate the sentence or set aside the 
plea of guilty or ion of the defendant, and finally 
alSffilSS case'" or [to] amend the judgment of convict 
to be a misdemeanor conviction," pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-
2604. 
In this case, Mr. Allen's version of facts as set forth 
in the pol reports was not credible. During sentencing, 
consideration was given to the aggravating and mitigating 
factors, including the effect of the crime on the victim, the 
nature of Mr. Allen, his attitude, credibility, remorse, and 
men state. Of particular concern was the severity of Mr. 
Allen's crime attempted strangulation and the rcumstances 
surrounding it. After considering Mr. Allen's actions and the 
way he accomplished the crime, it was necessary to impose a 
sentence that serves the primary objective of sentencing, which 
is the protection of society, as well as the related goal of 
de~erring the commission of similar violent crimes in the 
community by o~her potential defendants who are similarly 
situated. 
Although Mr. Allen may have made strides to become a better 
ci~izen, in the discretion of the Court, it appears that the 
severity of the crime and the method of its accomplishment 
militates against either the dismissal of the judgme:r:t of 
conviction or a reduction to a misdemeanor. 
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Issue 
Should this Court reconsider i~s ruling in the Memorandum 
Decision a~d Order? 
Argument 
1. This Court's reliance on "the severity ot Mr. Allen's 
crim; of attempted strangulation and the circumstances 
surroundina it" and the severity of the crime and ~he 
method of itsJs;;complishrnem:" as the basis for denving 
re&ief should be reconsidered. 
A significant reason (and perhaps the on stated reason 
for ~he Court's ruling was based on the Court's view that Mr. 
Allen's actions at the time of the offense ware very aggravating 
and that Mr. Allen's version of the facts as set out in the 
police report was "not credible." ~emorandum Decision and Order 
at pg. 8. Therefore, the Court ruled that the saverity of the 
crime and method of its acco~plishllient ml s a inst 
Idaho Code § 19-2604 relief because it is not ible h t 
public interes~. Id. at 8-9. 
!n this case, the Court was presented with two versions of 
events on the ni of August 12, 2009. The PSI, the police 
reports, and the ~estimony at the preliminary hearing in this 
case substantiate these different versions of what happened. 
However, the Court must recognize that the versions cf the events 
only became fferent at the point where Ms. Algren was 
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confronted with evidence that Mr. len had been sexually active 
with other women at the same time he was in his relationship wi 
her. 
A:.ternpted strangulation defined at Idaho Code § 18-923. 
The nature of ~he crime clearly makes it a serious one. While 
proof of the in:.ent to strangle or choke needs to be proved, 
physical injury need not be shcwn. 1 
It is very important to note that initially, Ms. Alhgren 
said that s and Mr. Allen were just verbally arguing when 
approached by Trooper Yount on the highway. She did not run to 
the officer screaming fer , or allege Mr. Allen had 
choked her or strangled her. !n fact, Ms. Alhgren actually 
said she was not hurt and the Trooper ~estified at e 
pre:irninary hearing he not notice any uries on 
Preliminary Hearing Transcript 1 pg. 92 ln 12. The Trooper s 
itial igation pertained to determining if wo.s an 
intoxicated pedestrian on the highway, and he determined that Ms. 
Alhgren's blood alcohol conte~t was .106. Mr. Allen was 
with driving wit.hout privileges at the scene, not attempted 
strangulation or any domestic related offense. 
Mr. Allen enter an plea in this case pursuant to North 
ca~olina v. Alf.p~d. 
M.EMORZ\NDTJM IN SUPPOR'l' OF 
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Subsequent to arrest, law enforcement di videos 
in ~he trunk of Mr. Allen's car. Ms. Alhgren was confronted with 
the videos by law enforcement. It was at that time thaL her new 
version of the events was portrayed to the police. Specifically, 
that she was grabbed under the chin and Lhat Mr. Allen's hand was 
against her throat. After time to reflect, Ms. Alhgren's version 
of events and injuries broadened, now including injuries to her 
nose, arm, elbow, with her throat, neck, and jaw. (See PSI 
and Police Report). 
Mr. Allen's version the events of that night di As 
described to pclice, one cannoL say that Mr. len's -Jersion 
is not e, while the post version of events of Ms. 
Alhgren are credible especially considering Ms. Alhgren's 
init statements tc the police that it was just a verbal 
argument. Clearly, Ms. Alhgren's version is the one Lhat has 
changed based on the record front of the court. 
At the conclusion of the preli~inary hearing in lS case 
the prosecuting attorney even s~a~ed that the kidnaping rge 
was "not quite as strong" and that he did not "think that re 
was probable cause for first degree." PrelimitJ.a.ry ng 
Transcript, pg. 95 lns 14-19. The kidnaping charge was 
ult ely dismissed. 
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All other charges and allegations al to ~n the police 
reports and I were either di ssed or never pursued. The 
charges from the State of Iowa that were identified in the PSI 
and police reports were dismissed. No other charges were brought 
by any other jurisdiction. only crime at issue, and the 
surrounding circumstances of that crime, is attempted 
strangulation. 
Even assuming Ms. Alhgren's version of events as true, is 
is not a case where the sever y of the cr or ~he of 
its accomplishment are so ious that relief under Idaho Code 
§ l9-2604 be inappropriate. This not a case lnvolv a 
victim was lei down forcib choked wi t!-1 t\•JO 
violent stereot cal version of attempted strangulation. The 
entirety of the event was scribed by Ms. Alhgren under direct 
examination that it 1) involved only one hand; 2) she was still 
able to breath; and 3) she d not blackout. Frel ry He:;a.ring 
Tra.nscript, at page 47-48. If Ms. Alhgren's sworn test was 
different, aggravated circumstances would arguably be 
present; however, that is no~ the case here. 
While we understand that the Court treats the factual basis 
surrou~ding an Alford plea as the truth and irrposes se~tence in 
the same way as a finding or admission of guilt, the Court cannot 
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· -'-h .... th · ·,.. a e 'nvo ing t'"'o d'_fferAn"· '.re•~"' i nn.s of ~gnore ~"aL ~s l~ cas ~- _ _w ~ ~ -- -~ ' ~~-·-
events. One version involved an intoxicated party who initially 
describes to law enforcement that she has no injuries, any 
dispute was only, and later recants those statemen1:s. The 
other version involving ~r. Allen who presented to the Court that 
based on his Alford that ~there really are no fac~s ~o 
scretion. 
to avoid a reaction. I 1 cad, and sh her 
PSI., at pg 
2. of this case is oomp...e.t:.ible with the oub.l._ic 
dismissal under Idaho Code 19-2604. "Public interest refers to 
tha~ which the public or the corr~unity at :arge s ar; interes;:.n 
State v .. eter, 2012 WL 4054112 ~ ile .,_ De~ter 
decision gives no specific guidance for what constitutes public 
interest, Court ment the e Attorney General 
Doctrine and how a portion of doctr 's test includes "the 
strength or soc al importanc~ of the public policy indicated by 
t:.he litigation," as a factor to consider. Id. 
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successfully rehabilitated upon sentencing. Rooted in s 
publ policy is Idaho Code § 19-2604, and the potential to have 
a conviction set aside. For years, the cri~inal justice system 
has !~creased punitive measures. These measures have not reduced 
recidivism a~d led to overgrown correct1onal facilities, 
hampered state and federal budgets, and a ing list of the 
public labeled as a convicted criminal. The stick approach does 
not work without a carrot. Dismissal of a criminal charge upon 
successful completion of probation provides the carrot a r the 
stick is used. 
As stated in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Mo on for 
Relief from Probation Violationr the most recent amendment to 
Idaho Code § 19-2604 was designed to provide a chance 
defendants to have their convictions set aside and provide an 
additional incentive to abide by probation. Legal counsel for 
the Supreme Court expressed that it provides aid for defendants 
in making them productive and contribut~ng citizens, leading to 
an increase in employmen~ and education oppo ties. As Deiter 
suggests, utilizing the Private Attorney General Dcct as 
guidance, it is important to society that offenders be 
rehabi tated and afforded the opportunity to be successful in 
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fe. Not granting Idaho Cede § 19-2604 relief cent s the 
convicted criminal label, decreases the abili ~c be successf~l, 
and may cause an individual to lose out on education and 
employment opportunities. Without these opportunit s, 
convicted, yet rehabilitated, defendants may be forced into 
unemployment, reliance on food stamps~ or other government 
financial assistance. aced in these strained situations, 
recidivism will likely se. Recidivism causes ed 
strain to the criminal justice system, which in turn p~aces 
further burden on society and the public at large with both 
public safety and Lax concerns. The public's interest is best 
served with the granting of § 19-2604 relief this case because 
Mr. Allen was successful during probat and should be a 
the relief to continue to be a benefit society rather n 
facing the stigmatic burden of being labeled a convict 
criminal, and facing the difficulLies associa with labeL 
Such is compatible th the public's interest. 
Conc~usi.on 
The Court is presented a "he sa /she saidn case 
involving an argument in a vehicle. The argument was never 
reported to the police by a third party or the parties 
themselves. It was only by chance that Trooper YounL was driving 
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by and started an stigation perLaining to into~icated 
pedestrians. 
These facts militate in favor of the requested relief of 
dismissal because the successful rehabilitation of Mr. Allen 
after a probationary period shows the Court that he is reformed 
and eager to become a productive member of society without be 
labeled a convicted felon. Granting the relief is compatible 
the public terest. 
JATED this ~. day of November, 20l2. 
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!N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRI OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHOt 
Pla 
vs. 
:LOKNIE ::,. ALLEK, 
Defendant. 
In accordance wi 
l\dministrat:i ve Rules, 
Rule 32 i cf 
Defendant 
NO .. CR-0 5l87 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SEAL RECORDS 
Idaho court 
1 t:hrough 
attorney ry I, Amendola of the law firm of AMENDOLA & DOTY, 
PLLC, submit:s the lowing Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Seal Records: 
Rule 32(i) of the Idaho Court Adminstrative R~les a~thorizes 
a trial court to seal records. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
expressly held that Rule 32(i) is the correct: rule for a Court t:o 
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apply in a proceeding on a criminal defendant's motion to seal 
records. State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 869, 871 (2009). Further, 
Idaho law states that ~he custodian judge of the criminal :;..e is 
inves~ed with discretion to de~ermine if a person s privacy 
interest in sealing a case file trumps the public's interest. 
Doe v. State, 2012 WL 4712013 (Idaho App .. 
In order to qualify for ief under Rule 32(i) a defendant 
must show ~hat some privacy interest dominates over public 
disclosure of ~he file.: In addition, Court: must make a 
written findir~.g 
(1 That the documents or mater contain 
facts or statements, the publication 
highly ectionable to a reasonable 
2 That documents or materials contain cts or 
statements thaL the court finds might be libelous, or 
3) That the documents cr mate ls cor..ta fact:s or 
r:e 
s~atements, the dissemination or publication of ct would 
reasonably result in economic or ial loss or harm to a 
person having an interest the documents or materials, or 
'online access to the Idaho Judicial Repository provloes 
employers, landlords, neighbors and total strangers with the 
ability to view very detailed and intimate information about a 
person. Although the long term affects of access to this 
information by anyone Wltn an internet connection has nor: been 
determined, it is an enormous individual privacy concern. 
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compromise the security of personnel, records or public 
property of or used by the judicial dep~rtment, or 
(4) That the documents or materials contain facts or 
s~atements that migh~ thre~ten or endanger the life or 
sa of individuals, or 
(5) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redac~ the 
documents or mater s. 
In this case, a strong argument can be that this Court could 
and should make a finding that subsections 1)-(4) are all 
applicable. 
The Court's file contains documents with highly int e 
facts about and statements made no-c J.en and Ms. 
, but also about and o1:her persons unrelated to t s 
case whatsoever. The publi on those 
facts and statements would be highly objectionable to a 
reasonable person, including the women mentioned in the police 
report. This is true because the file contains rna 1 of 
sexually imate activity, statements, and de~ that ne 
Mr. Allen, Ms. Algren or any of the other named persons 
want to available for public disclosure. Court's file ar:d 
records in s casa should be sealed from disclosure and public 
inspection under Rula 32(i) (1). 
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In addition, the documents in the Court's file contain 
stateme~ts that may be viewed as libelous. Besides identifying 
specific women, the police reports contain general statements 
that it is unknown how many women were involved in the videos 
seized by ce. There is also reference that Mr. Allen's 
allegedly has a sexually transmitted disease. He that is 
true. See Affidavit e Lee Allen. Because of the false 
nature of these statements, the disclosure of the Court s file 
should be viewed as libelous. The Court's file and records 
should be sealed from publ~c dis osJre and public inspection 
under Rule 32(i 2 , 
Furthermore, the documents ln ~he 's le contain 
statements that the publication of which may reasonably result in 
economic or fina~cial loss or harm to Mr. Allen, Ms. Alhgren, or 
others, As previous outlined, the documents in this file 
contain highly in~imate and sexual information. While this 
information may have economic and financial impact on Mr. Allen, 
presently and in the future, the analysis under Rule 32(1 (3) 
does net end there. Ms. Alhgren, or any of the other women 
~entioned in the Court's file, may reasonably suffer the same 
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type of harm because present and future employers have access to 
the file. The Court's file and records snoula be sealed from 
disclosure and public view under Rule 32(i) 3). 
Lastly, the documents in the Court's file contain statemenLs 
that may threaten or endanger the life or safety of not only Mr. 
Allen, but others as well. The police reports in this case 
contain inform.aLio!1 of extrama.r::tal sexual affairs among a number 
of persons who are not associated in any way wlth this case. 
safety e persons s d be a concern. public 
disclosure of the Court's fi in this case may put a number of 
peop:e at risk to li or ical safety because of the 
int nature of the file. 
Court's file ana records should sealed from public disc sure 
and inspection under Rule 32(i 4 
It is respectfully requested that Court grant Mr. 
A:len's Motion Lo Seal Records. 
DATED s « day of November, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that en the .)._ of November, 2012, I 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Louis Marshall 
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
127 S. FIRST AVENUE 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
District Judge Steve Verby 
BONNER COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
215 S. FIRST AVENUE 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
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11/20/12 TIME: 3:00PM 
STATE OF IDAHO vs LONNIE LEE ALLEN 
Plaintiff I Petitioner Defendant I Respondent 
Atty: VALERiE FENTON Atty: GARY AMENDOLA 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS 
CHARGE 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/ MOTION TO SEAL 
WORKED FOR THEM JUST AT 6 MONTHS, THEY WERE VERY HAPPY WITH MYWORK, 
MANAGER FOR CALIFORNIA SALES AND DESiGNS FOR CASCADE, LOTS OF PREViOUS 
SALES EXPERIENCE, (LISTS HISTORY OF SALES) BEGAN AS TEMPORARY TO SEE 
HOW I DID AND WOULD PERFORM IT WAS A NEW TERRITORY FOR THE COMPANY 
AFTER A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME !TWAS AGREED THEY WOULD HIRE ME FULL 
I FILLED OUT THE REST OF THE PAPERWORK AND THEY DID THEIR 
PRELiMINARY CHECKS iNVESTIGATION INTO WHO I WAS, I DID NOT GET THE JOB DUE 
TO THE NATURE OF THE POSITION GOVERNMENT CONTRACT THAT SOMEONE WITH A 
FELONY COULD NOT BE IN THAT POSITION, THE JOB WAS THEN OVER, HAVE APPLIED 
• FOR OTHER JOBS ROLJGHL Y 20 JOBS, MY BELIEF I WAS WELL QUALIFIED FOR ANY OF 
THOSE JOBS, NOT EVEN AN INTERVIEW FOR ANY OF THE JOBS, THAT HAS NEVER 
rlAPPENED BEFORE, I BELIEVE IT IS DUE TO MY CONVICTION, I DO NOT NOR HAVE 
NEVER HAD A SEXUALL TRANSMITTED DISEASE, ASKING TO HAVE CASE DISMISSED. 
LOGICALLY IT SEEMS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE THE FELONY OFF, ALL 
;PPLICATIONS ASK IF YOU ARE A FELON OR HAVE COMMITTED A FELONY, IF IT WERE 
A MISDErv'IEANOR IT SEEMS WOULD MORE EASILY FIND A JOB, SEVERAL PENDING 
APPLICATIONS FOR WORK, HAVE BEEN UNEMPLOYED FOR FOUR MONTHS, HAVE 
NEVER HAD TO BE ON E!v1PLOYMENT OR SUBSIDIZED PROGRAMS, SINCE THIS HAS 
rlAPPENED I'VE GONE THROUGH LIFE SAVINGS, HOME, 401 K, AT THE POINT WHERE I 
GA HAVE LAID OUT 
NATURAL CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING A FELONY IS PROBABLY WHAT YOU HAVE 
,lUST HEARD HAS HAPPEN::D TO MR ALLEN EMPLOYABILITY BECOMES MUCH MORE 
IF HE IS NO! 
CASE NO. o.;--.=: 11120112 Page 1 of 2 
COURT ~.t1iNUTES 0~8,0 
INTEREST IN THE RELIEF \IVE ARE THINKING OF NO OTHER FELONIES, A 
; MISDEMEANOR FROM LONG AGO THAT WE ADDRESSED SEEMS TO ME THIS IS AN 
APPROPRIATE CASE FOR COURT TO EXERCISE DISCRETION AND OPEN UP THE 
FUTURE AGAIN FOR LONNiE, SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT TO ASK YOU TO CONSIDER THE 
ALTERNATIVE AND CHANGE TO A MISDEMEANOR BECAUSE I THINK A DISMISSAL IS 
APPROPRIATE, BUT IF YOU ARE NOT WILLING TO DO THAT 
~v10TION TO SEAL WE HAVE ADDRESSED IN OUR MEMORANDUM, THIS IS A CASE 
THAT CONTAINS SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF INFORMATION THAT HAS TO DEAL WITH 
UNRELATED THIRD PARTIES MAKES STRONG CASE TO SEAL FOR THAT REASON, IF 
ONLY ABOUT HIM! WOULD HAVE TO DIG A WHOLE LOT DEEPER TO COME UP WITH 
,:::LJBUC NTEREST JUSTiF1CATION BUT A LOT MORE AS WE OUTLINED IN OUR BRIEF A 
NOT TRUE AND IS RELATED TO OTHER PEOPLE ANY 
IS 
REQUEST AS TO MOTlOI\! TO SEAL HE DOES HAVE A POINT ABOUT THE INFORMATION 
THAT IS THE FILE WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SEALING THOSE PORTIONS OR THE 
ENTIRE FtLE 
CASE NO. CR-09-5'157 TE: 11/20/12 Page 2 of2 
COURT MINUTES 0~81 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
) 




) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
) re: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION AND 
LONNIE L. ALLEN, 




Upon reconsideration, the Court affirms its earlier finding that Idaho Code 
§ 19-2604 relief is not compatible with the public interest. Therefore, the 
defendant's motion for reconsideration is denied. 
The Court concludes that the public interest in disclosure outweighs Mr. 
Allen's interest in privacy. Therefore, the defendant's motion to seal his criminal 
records is denied. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 2, 20 11, Defendant Lonnie L. Allen moved the Court for relief under Idaho 
Code § 19-2604 and for relief from a probation violation. Specifically, Mr. Allen sought an 
order setting aside his guilty plea and conviction and dismissing the case. He also sought an 
order setting aside his admission to a probation violation. The State did not file a response. Mr. 
Allen's motions came before the Court for hearing on December 20, 2011, and July 2, 2012. 
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After considering the defendant's written submissions and the oral arguments of counsel, 
on August 27, 2012, the Court entered a "Memorandum Decision and Order re: Defendant's 
Motion for Relief from Probation Violation and Motion for Relief Under I.C. § 19-2604." In the 
decision, the Court found that when faced with the aggravated circumstances presented in this 
case, it is not "compatible with the public interest, [to] terminate the sentence or set aside the 
plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case ... or [to] amend the 
judgment of conviction ... to be a misdemeanor conviction," pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604. 
Based on this and the other findings and conclusions set forth in the August 2ih Memorandum 
Decision and Order, the defendant's motion for relief from the probation violation and motion 
for reliefunder Idaho Code § 19-2604 were denied. 
On September 10, 2012, Mr. Allen filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the August 2th 
Memorandum Decision and Order. He also filed a Motion to Seal Records, requesting an order 
sealing all of the records in this case pursuant to Idaho Administrative Rule 32(i). The State did 
not file a response. 
NOW, THEREFORE, after considering the written submissions of the defendant, as well 
as the oral arguments of counsel, this Memorandum Decision and Order are issued. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW 
A. Standard for Motion for Reconsideration 
In State v .. lvfontague, 114 Idaho 319, 756 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Supreme 
Court set forth the standard of review for a motion for reconsideration in a criminal proceeding: 
Montague first raises a procedural challenge to the manner in which the 
district court handled the suppression question. Specifically, Montague contends 
that the trial court did not have authority to entertain the state's request for 
reconsideration of the suppression ruling. Apparently, Montague would have us 
hold that because such a request is not specifically mentioned in the rules of 
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criminal procedure, a trial court is without power to act upon it. This position is 
without merit. 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, upon which the Idaho 
Criminal Rules are based, similarly omit mention of motions or requests for 
reconsideration. However, the federal courts have held that a trial court is 
free to entertain such a motion when made. E.g, United States v. Scott, 524 
F.2d 465 (5th Cir.l975). On appeal, the federal standard for reviewing a trial 
court's decision to reconsider is whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 2027, 85 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985). We believe the federal 
approach is sound. 
In the present case, the state filed a brief in support of its request for 
reconsideration, citing authority not previously brought to the trial court's 
attention. The state also presented an affidavit from the arresting officer which 
included information not earlier provided in opposition to the suppression motion. 
The judge was not bound to consider this new information. Indeed, the state ran a 
risk in not making its best presentation when the suppression motion was 
originally heard. However, the judge had discretion to reexamine his prior 
ruling and to consider all information pertinent to the subject. We find no 
abuse of that discretion in this case. 
Id at 320-321, 756 P.2d at 1084-1085. (Emphasis supplied). 
B. Standard for Determining Whether to Seal Records 
Idaho Administrative Rule 32(i), which governs limitations on disclosure of judicial 
records, states: 
(i) Other Prohibitions or Limitations on Disclosure and A1otions Regarding the 
Sealing of Records. Physical and electronic records, may be disclosed, or 
temporarily or permanently sealed or redacted by order of the court on a case-by-
case basis. Any person or the court on its own motion may move to disclose, 
redact, seal or unseal a part or all of the records in any judicial proceeding. 
The custodian judge shall hold a hearing on the motion after the moving 
party gives notice of the hearing to all parties to the judicial proceeding and 
any other interested person, guardian ad litem, court visitor, ward or 
protected person, personal representative, guardian, or conservator 
designated by the custodian judge. In ruling on whether specific records 
should be disclosed, redacted or sealed by order of the court, the court shall 
determine and make a finding of fact as to whether the interest in privacy or 
public disclosure predominates. If the court redacts or seals records to protect 
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predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the least restrictive exception 
from disclosure consistent with privacy interests. Before a court may enter an 
order redacting or sealing records, it must also make one or more of the 
following determinations in writing: 
(1) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or statements, 
the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, or 
(2) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that the court finds 
might be libelous, or 
(3) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, the dissemination 
or publication of which may compromise the financial security of, or could 
reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to, a person having an 
interest in the documents or materials, or compromise the security of personnel, 
records or public property of or used by the judicial department, or 
(4) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that might threaten 
or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or 
(5) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the documents or materials to 
preserve the right to a fair trial. 
In applying these rules, the court is referred to the traditional legal concepts 
in the law of the right to a fair trial, invasion of privacy, defamation, and 
invasion of proprietary business records as well as common sense respect for 
shielding highly intimate or financially sensitive material about persons. 
When a record is sealed under this rule, it shall not be subject to examination, 
inspection or copying by the public. When the court issues an order sealing or 
redacting records, the court shall also inform the Clerk of the District Court of 
which specific files, documents and !STARS records are to be sealed or redacted. 
Sealed files shall be marked "sealed" on the outside of the file. Sealed or redacted 
records shall be placed in a manila envelope marked "sealed" with a general 
description of the records, their filing date and date they were sealed or redacted. 
When a file has been ordered sealed, or when records within a file have been 
ordered sealed or redacted, the electronic record shall reflect such action and shall 
be limited accordingly. ·when the court issues an order redacting records for 
purposes of public disclosure, the records in the court file or in the custody of the 
court shall not be altered in any fashion. The originals shall be placed in a manila 
envelope marked "sealed" with a general description of the records, and a 
redacted copy, so marked, shall be substituted for the originals in the court file. 
An order directing that records be redacted or sealed shall be subject to 
examination, inspection or copying by the public to the extent that such disclosure 
does not reveal the information that the court sought to protect in issuing the 
order. The decision on a motion to redact, seal or unseal records may be 
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reconsidered, altered or amended by the court at any time. When the court issues 
an order disclosing otherwise exempt records, it shall place appropriate limitations 
on the dissemination ofthat information. 
l.A.R. 32(i). (Emphasis supplied). 
In Doe v. State, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 4712013 (Ct. App. 2012), which dealt with the 
issue of the request to seal a criminal case file, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
Decisions of a court to grant or deny a request to seal or redact a 
judicial record are subject to review for abuse of discretion. State v. Turpen, 
147 Idaho 869, 872, 216 P.3d 627, 630 (2009). On review, we ask: 
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion: (2) 
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) 
whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 421, 224 P.3d 485, 488 (2009): State v. Hedger, 
115 Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
Idaho's public records law provides that "[ e ]very person has a right to 
examine and take a copy of any public record of this state and there is a 
presumption that all public records in Idaho are open at all reasonable times for 
inspection except as otherwise expressly provided by statute." I. C. § 9-338(1 ). 
Records within court files of judicial proceedings may be exempted from 
disclosure, however, pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court. I. C.§ 
9-340A. The Court adopted Administrative Rule 32 to define when public access 
to judicial records may be denied. The rule recognizes the public's general "right 
to examine and copy the judicial department's declarations of law and public 
policy and to examine and copy the records of all proceedings open to the public," 
I.C.A.R. 32(a), but also authorizes a custodian judge to seal or redact judicial 
records in limited circumstances. The 2010 version of I.C.A.R. 32(i) ... applied 
when Doe filed his motion and the district court acted upon it ... 
We proceed, then, to examine Doe's claims of error. He argues that the 
court erred by holding that as a matter of law I.C.A.R. 32(i) does not authorize the 
sealing of a criminal case file at the request of the convicted defendant who claims 
that public access to those records is causing or may cause economic harm. When 
interpreting a rule of our Supreme Court, Idaho courts apply the same standards of 
construction as are utilized with statutes. Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 350, 
924 P.2d 607, 612 (1996). "We begin with an examination of the literal words of 
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the rule and give the language its plain, obvious and rational meaning." Id; State 
v. Trejo, 132 Idaho 872, 878,979 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Ct.App.l999). 
In 2010, Rule 32(i) provided that "any interested person ... may move to 
disclose, redact, seal or unseal a part or all of the records in any judicial 
proceeding." The term "[a]ny interested person" is broad in its sweep and does not 
exclude an individual convicted in a criminal case. The rule also provided that 
case records could be sealed if the court found that "the documents or materials 
contain facts or statements, the dissemination or publication of which would 
reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to a person having an 
interest in the documents or materials,'' see I.C.A.R. 32(i)(3), and if the court 
further found that this privacy interest predominated over the public's interest in 
disclosure. Again, the language does not preclude relief to a convicted criminal. 
Only two Idaho appellate decisions address the application of I.C.A.R. 
32(i), and both involve a request to seal a criminal case file. In Turpen, 147 Idaho 
869, 216 P.3d 627, a person who had been acquitted of a misdemeanor offense 
moved to seal his criminal case file. asserting economic harm similar to that 
advanced by Doe in this case, but the magistrate denied the motion. Our Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded because neither the parties nor the trial court had 
recognized that the motion was governed by I.C.A.R. 32 and therefore the trial 
court had not applied the standards set out in the rule. In State v. Gurney, 152 
Idaho 502, 272 P .3d 4 7 4 (20 12), the movant had pleaded guilty to a felony but, 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604(1), his plea was later set aside and the case 
dismissed following his exemplary performance in drug court. The movant 
asserted economic harm similar to that claimed by Doe. Our Supreme Court held 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 
public's interest in disclosure of the criminal proceedings predominated over the 
movant's privacy interest and that the criminal case file would not be sealed. 
Gurney, 152 Idaho at 504-05, 272 P.3d at 476-77. In neither case did the 
Supreme Court hold or imply that relief was unavailable under I.C.A.R. 32(i)(3), 
as a matter of law, for a former criminal defendant (convicted or not) who sought 
the sealing of a criminal case file, or that the type of economic harm asserted was 
not cognizable under I.C.A.R. 32(i)(3). 
The State argues, however, that the rule's inapplicability to the type of 
economic harm claimed by Doe is made clear by the following sentence from 
I.C.A.R. 32(i): "In applying these rules, the court is referred to the traditional legal 
concepts in the law of the right to a fair trial, invasion of privacy, defamation, and 
invasion of proprietary business records as well as common sense respect for 
shielding highly intimate or financially sensitive material about persons." 
According to the State, the reference to "invasion of proprietary business records" 
limits the economic interest protected by the rule to business-related economic 
loss such as that which could arise from revelation of trade secrets or similar 
proprietary information. We are unpersuaded. The sentence in question broadly 
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suggests factors for a custodian judge's consideration. It does not purport to 
impose a narrow and rigid boundary upon the type of financial loss or economic 
interest that may be considered by a court on a motion to seal judicial records. 
We find in that sentence no intent by our Supreme Court that I.C.A.R. 32(i)(3) is 
to protect only businesses' economic interests while leaving the personal financial 
interests of individuals unprotected. 
We conclude that Rule 32(i) gives the court discretion to consider the 
many types of economic or financial loss that may be reasonably asserted as a 
claimed justification for sealing court records, including financial harm 
asserted by those convicted of crimes. Therefore, we hold that the district 
court here misinterpreted the rule and consequently did not recognize that it 
possessed discretion to order the sealing of a criminal record in this 
circumstance. 
That is not to suggest, however, that the motion must be granted here 
or in any similar case. On remand, the district court will have broad 
discretion to determine whether Doe's claim of economic harm is so 
compelling as to outweigh the overarching public interest in disclosure. 
Because the public interest in access to criminal court records is obviously 
weighty, we surmise it would be an exceptional circumstance where a 
custodian judge would find that interest exceeded by a convicted person's 
assertion of economic harm flowing from the conviction. But this surmise is 
not a substitute for the custodian judge's proper application of the rule by 
making the required finding as to whether the movant's interest in privacy or 
the public interest in disclosure predominates. 
!d. at **2, 4-5. (Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis supplied). 
Ill. DISCUSSION 
A. Idaho Code§ 19-2604 Relief is Not Compatible With the Public Interest 
Mr. Allen is requesting that the Court reconsider its earlier decision to deny him relief 
under Idaho Code § 19-2604. Idaho Code § 19-2604 states, in part: 
... the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause 
for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public 
interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the 
defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant or may amend 
the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of 
correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior 
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to suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor 
conviction .... 
I. C. § 19-2604(1 ). (Emphasis supplied). 
Mr. Allen argues that the Court was presented with two versions of the events of the night 
his crime of attempted strangulation was committed. In other words, it is a "he said/she said" 
between Mr. Allen's and the victim's different versions of events. Mr. Allen asserts that even 
assuming the victim's version of events is true, this is not a case where the severity of the crime 
or the method of its accomplishment are so egregious that relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604 
would be inappropriate. The victim described the incident at the preliminary hearing as 
involving only one hand against her throat. She stated that she was still able to breath during the 
incident, and she did not blackout. Mr. Allen maintains that these are not ''aggravated 
circumstances" because this is not a case involving a victim who was held do\\'11 and forcibly 
choked w·ith two hands in a violent stereotypical version of attempted strangulation. 
Mr. Allen further contends that dismissal of this case is compatible with the public 
interest because the public has an interest in any criminal defendant being successfully 
rehabilitated upon sentencing. Mr. Allen claims he was successful during probation and should 
be afforded relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604 so that he can continue to be a benefit to society 
rather than facing the stigma of being labeled a convicted criminal, and facing the difficulties 
associated with that label. 
In the exercise of its discretion, after reexamining its prior ruling and considering all 
information pertinent to the issue submitted by the defendant at the hearings on the original 
motion and at the reconsideration hearing, the Court affirms its earlier finding that the dismissal 
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of Mr. Allen's conviction or the amendment of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor is not 
compatible with the public interest because: 
Of particular concern was the severity of Mr. Allen's crime of attempted 
strangulation and the circumstances surrounding it. After considering Mr. Allen's 
actions and the way he accomplished the crime, it was necessary to impose a 
sentence that serves the primary objective of sentencing, which is the protection of 
society, as well as the related goal of deterring the commission of similar violent 
crimes in the community by other potential defendants who are similarly situated. 
Although Mr. Allen may have made strides to become a better citizen, in the 
discretion of the Court, it appears that the severity of the crime and the method of its 
accomplishment militates against either the dismissal of the judgment of conviction 
or a reduction to a misdemeanor. 
Afemorandum Decision and Order (August 27, 2012), at pp. 8-9. 
Accordingly, Mr. Allen's motion for reconsideration is denied. 
B. The Public Interest in Disclosure Outweighs the Defendant's Privacy Interest 
Mr. Allen claims that his criminal records should be sealed because having a felony 
conviction on his record makes it difficult for him to obtain employment, causing him to suffer 
financial harm. 
Idaho Administrative Rule 32(i) allows the Court to enter an order redacting or sealing 
judicial records upon the making of one or more of the determinations set forth in subsections (1) 
through (5) in writing. Rule 32(i)(3) allows a record to be sealed if the Court finds: 
That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, the dissemination or 
publication of which may compromise the financial security of, or could 
reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to, a person having an 
interest in the documents or materials, or compromise the security of personnel, 
records or public property of or used by the judicial department, ... 
In addition to this finding, the Court must also find that the Mr. Allen's "claim of economic harm 
is so compelling as to outweigh the overarching public interest in disclosure." Doe v. State, 2012 
WL 4712013, at *5. 
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The protection of society is the public interest at stake in this matter. One of the Court's 
goals is to protect society from individuals, like Mr. Allen, who have committed serious crimes 
and have the potential to recidivate. In this case, Mr. Allen's claim of economic harm is NOT so 
compelling as to outweigh the overarching public interest in disclosure. Because of the 
circumstances involved in this case, it generated a substantial amount of community interest. 
In Doe v. State, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 4712013 (Ct. App. 2012), the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated: 
Because the public interest in access to criminal court records is obviously 
weighty, we surmise it would be an exceptional circumstance \Vhere a custodian 
judge would find that interest exceeded by a convicted person's assertion of 
economic harm flowing from the conviction. 
ld. at *5. 
Mr. Allen has not presented the Court with any "exceptional circumstance" that would warrant 
the sealing of his criminal records. While he believes that his disclosure to prospective 
employers that he is a convicted felon hurts his chances for employment, whether or not the court 
record is sealed has not been shown to adversely affect his employment capabilities. Thus it 
appears that the major impediment to employment is the conviction itself. This Court, in the 
exercise of its discretion, concludes that the public interest in disclosure outweighs Mr. Allen's 
interest in privacy. Accordingly, his motion to seal his criminal records is denied. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Motion to Seal Records are hereby DENIED. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER re: DEFENDANT'S 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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l. The Appellant appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
~he Memorandum Decision and Order re: Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Motion to Seal Records entered in this case 
on December 12, 2012 by District Judge Steve Verby. 
2. The Appellant has a ght to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court under Rule ll(c) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
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3. The issues on appeal are whether the District Court 
abused s discretion in denying the Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and the Defendant's Motion to Seal Records. 
4. In accordance with Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
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Rules, the Appellant requests the Clerk's Record to include the 
January 13, 2010 Judgment and Commitment and Order of Probation 
and alJ. documents filed in this case from December 2, 2011 to 
December 12, 2012. 
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of the December 20, 2011 ring, the July 2, 2012 hearing; and 
Nove~~er 20, 2012 hea in s case. 
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A. The estimated fees for the reporter's transcripts 
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obtained. 
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the time the Notice of Appeal is filed. 
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pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, i.e., the State 
of Idaho via Sonner County Prosecuting Attorney Louis Marshal~ 
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